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GRASSROOTS CHALLENGES TO THE 
EFFECTS OF PRISON SPRAWL ON  
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES FOR  
INCARCERATED PEOPLE 
Stefen R. Short* 
ABSTRACT 
New York State’s prison system is broken in several ways, many of 
which are linked to a fundamental geographical problem.  Almost all 
of New York’s fifty-four state prisons are located in rural, under-
resourced communities.  Prison units serving people with mental 
health needs are concentrated in communities with major physician 
shortages.  Without a drastic influx of resources, New York’s prisons 
will continue to over-utilize “half-measures,” such as video 
teleconferencing, in a failed attempt to meet the mental health needs 
of incarcerated people.  Lawyers continue to develop strategies—
most of which are based in Eighth Amendment litigation—to either 
improve prison mental health care or increase prison mental health 
resources.  But litigation is not the solution to every social problem 
and it most likely will not solve this problem on its own.  Eighth 
Amendment litigation cannot change demographics, ameliorate 
physician shortages, or reverse prison sprawl. 
Movement lawyers have known since time immemorial that 
grassroots approaches to major social problems—those that engage 
communities directly impacted and intentionally subsume the role of 
lawyers and legal work—create the most sustainable type of change.  
Grassroots approaches have successfully addressed prison and jail 
siting problems in New York.  This Article argues that only through 
grassroots approaches can movement lawyers, activists, and advocates 
                                                                                                                 
* Staff Attorney, Prisoners’ Rights Project of The Legal Aid Society of New York 
City; former Staff Attorney, Disability Rights New York.  I wish to thank Joseph E. 
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address the underlying geographical problems causing the overuse of 
video teleconferencing, and other quality of care deficiencies, in New 
York State prisons.  Though Eighth Amendment litigation will play a 
role, it will work only when combined with strong grassroots 
advocacy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the mid-1950s, amidst burgeoning awareness among social 
justice activists of the abuse and neglect of individuals with mental 
health needs in psychiatric hospitals, the number of individuals 
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confined to those hospitals peaked.1  Five hundred and sixty thousand 
patients were held in often brutal conditions, and scores of them were 
denied access to basic necessities of life, such as the right to form and 
maintain interpersonal relationships.2  Rather than simply accept such 
severe restrictions upon their humanity, people who were confined to 
institutions told their stories.3  Due chiefly to their courage and the 
courage of their families and friends, a robust psychiatric 
deinstitutionalization movement emerged.4  That movement—at its 
peak during the 1960s and 1970s—forced psychiatric professionals, 
state governments, and the federal government to reckon with a 
treatment model that systematically devalued the lives of thousands 
of people.5  Although many states shuttered large psychiatric 
institutions in response to that movement, a large number of them—
including New York—failed to devote necessary resources to the 
development of robust, community-based alternatives that could 
provide psychiatric care.6  Because the creation of a community-based 
care model, the chief goal of the deinstitutionalization movement, was 
not actualized, some scholars consider the movement a failure.7  
Furthermore, many of those in need who stood to benefit from the 
movement wound up poor, destitute, or homeless as a result—
arguably not much better off than they were before.8 
                                                                                                                 
 1. William H. Fisher et al., The Changing Role of the State Psychiatric Hospital, 
28 HEALTH AFFAIRS 676, 676–78 (2009); see also Deanna Pan, Timeline: 
Deinstitutionalization and Its Consequences, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 29, 2013), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/04/timeline-mental-health-america/ 
[https://perma.cc/5BQM-82RN] (describing population trends in psychiatric 
hospitals). 
 2. Pan, supra note 1; see also Walid Fakhoury & Stefan Priebe, 
Deinstitutionalization and Reinstitutionalization: Major Changes in the Provision of 
Mental Health Care, 6 PSYCHIATRY 313, 313 (2007). 
 3. See Albert Q. Maisel, Bedlam 1946: Most U.S. Mental Hospitals Are a Shame 
and a Disgrace, LIFE, May 6, 1946, at 102. 
 4. Deinstitutionalization: A Psychiatric “Titanic,” PBS FRONTLINE, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/asylums/special/excerpt.html 
[https://perma.cc/SH7S-HPXU]. 
 5. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization 
Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 7 (2002) (discussing the successes and failures of 
the psychiatric deinstitutionalization movement). 
 6. Editorial, Suffering in the Streets, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 1984), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/09/16/opinion/suffering-streets-deinstitutionalization-
22-letter-mouthful-that-once-referred.html [https://perma.cc/6W65-WFJ4]. 
 7. See Hitesh C. Sheth, Deinstitutionalization or Disowning Responsibility, 13 
INT’L J. PSYCHOSOCIAL REHABILITATION 11, 11–21 (2009) (discussing the growth of 
prisons and jails as de-facto mental health institutions due to a governmental failure 
to devote adequate resources to deinstitutionalization). 
 8. Id. 
440 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
The “law and order” movement, which grew alongside the 
deinstitutionalization movement, led to the increasingly draconian 
criminalization of conduct often related to, or directly attributable to, 
mental health needs.9  Driven largely by establishment politicians 
increasingly buoyed by “tough on crime” rhetoric, the “law and 
order” movement produced significant regressive legal reforms.10  
One such example are New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws, enacted 
in 1973, which mandated harsher penalties for both the sale and 
possession of small amounts of banned narcotics.11  The Rockefeller 
Drug Laws and other state and federal laws enacted during the “law 
and order” movement criminalized conduct often attributable to a 
manifestation of mental health needs.12  For example, increased 
criminalization of substance abuse disproportionately impacts 
individuals with mental health needs, as over fifty percent of people 
                                                                                                                 
 9. James Ridgeway & Jean Casella, Criminalizing Mental Illness: The Story of 
Adam Hall, SOLITARY WATCH (Mar. 14, 2012), http://solitarywatch.com/2012/05/14/
criminalizing-mental-illness-the-story-of-adam-hall/ [https://perma.cc/YV4S-ZJX4]; 
see also Nicholas Kristof, Opinion, Inside a Mental Hospital Called Jail, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 9, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/opinion/sunday/inside-a-mental-
hospital-called-jail.html [https://nyti.ms/2jL2Om3] (discussing growth of prison and 
jail mental health populations as a result of increasing arrests for “offenses that flow 
from mental illness”). 
 10. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE GROWTH OF 
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES 336 (2014) (“Across all branches and levels 
of government, the policies governing criminal processing and sentencing were 
reformed to expand the use of incarceration.  Prison time was increasingly required 
for lesser offenses.  Time served was significantly increased for violent crimes and for 
repeat offenses.  Drug crimes, particularly street dealing in urban areas, became 
policed and punished more severely . . . . These changes in punishment policy—the 
enactment of mandatory sentence laws, long sentences for violence and repeat 
offenses, and intensified criminalization of drug-related activity—were the main and 
proximate drivers of the growth in incarceration.”). 
 11. Jeremy W. Peters, Albany Reaches Deal to Repeal ’70s Drug Laws,  
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/nyregion/
26rockefeller.html [https://nyti.ms/2lpaxoR]. 
 12. See Press Release, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, NYCLU Announces Findings 
About Statewide Impact of Rockefeller Drug Laws (Mar. 11, 2009), 
https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/nyclu-announces-findings-about-statewide-
impact-rockefeller-drug-laws [https://perma.cc/E7ZE-VZEZ] (finding that “[m]any 
of the thousands of New Yorkers in prison under these laws suffer from substance 
abuse problems; many others struggle with issues related to homelessness, mental 
illness or unemployment”). See generally Ellen Hochstedler Steury, Specifying 
Criminalization of the Mentally Disordered Misdemeanant, 82 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 334 (1991) (discussing and specifying the definition of 
“criminalization” in the context of offenses related to mental health needs). 
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with mental health needs have a co-occurring and related substance 
use disorder.13 
The results of these two movements cohered.  As the “law and 
order” movement increasingly criminalized mental health-related 
conduct, the deinstitutionalization movement failed to shield 
individuals with mental health needs from the criminal justice system 
because it did not create the type of robust treatment model shown to 
prevent arrest and incarceration.14  Research has demonstrated that 
the increase in individuals with mental health needs in jails and 
prisons is directly correlated with the lack of mental health services 
available in community settings.15  Left to fend for themselves 
without access to robust treatment, individuals with mental health 
needs were ever more imperiled by New York’s emergent “law and 
order” ethos.16  That ethos’s harsh response to manifestations of 
mental health-related conduct, combined with New York’s lack of 
resources to treat such manifestations, led inexorably to an increase in 
the incarceration rate of individuals with mental health needs over 
several decades.17  Between 1991 and 2002, the percentage of 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See B.C. Div., Criminalization of Mental Illness, CAN. MENTAL HEALTH 
ASS’N (Mar. 2005), http://www.antoniocasella.eu/archipsy/CMHA_march2005.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/49FE-XXWU] (“For a minority of people, usually those with 
multiple complex needs, deinstitutionalization combined with a lack of 
comprehensive community support systems has resulted in another type of 
‘institutionalization,’ with prisons and jails rather than hospitals.  This is only one of 
the factors leading to an increase in what is generally known as the ‘criminalization of 
mental illness,’ i.e. where a criminal, legal response overtakes a medical response to 
behaviour related to mental illness . . . . Over 50% of people with mental illness have 
a co-occurring substance abuse disorder.  Co-occurring disorders (mental illness and 
substance use disorder) are more difficult to treat than either mental illness or 
substance abuse alone, and there are insufficient treatment programs for the growing 
demand.”). 
 14. Access to Mental Health Care and Incarceration, MENTAL HEALTH AM., 
http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/issues/access-mental-health-care-and-
incarceration [https://perma.cc/Z5QX-KKH7] (“In 2015, the Sentencing Project 
ranked the states based on the number of people incarcerated in state prison per 
100,000 residents.  Comparing state-by-state rates of incarceration with the access to 
mental health care ranking show a strong positive correlation between rates of 
adult[s] who are in the criminal justice system and lack of access to mental health 
care.”). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See discussion infra Part I. 
 17. E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., THE TREATMENT 
OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS IN PRISONS AND JAILS: A STATE SURVEY 73 
(2014), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/treatment-
behind-bars/treatment-behind-bars.pdf [https://perma.cc/WY77-24N3] (“As the state 
mental hospitals have been downsized and closed, there has been a concomitant 
increase in mentally ill persons in the county jails and state prisons . . . . The state’s 
prisons, by default, have taken the place of psychiatric centers.”). 
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individuals receiving active mental health treatment in in New York 
prisons increased by 73%.18  Over that same time period, the overall 
prison population increased by 14.6%.19  The increase in those 
incarcerated with mental health needs was five times greater than the 
increase in the overall prison population.20  As recently as 2012, one-
quarter of incarcerated individuals nationwide were diagnosed with 
mental health needs.21  These trends, along with a lack of fiscal 
resources, have burdened Central New York Psychiatric Center 
(“CNYPC”), the New York State Office of Mental Health (“OMH”) 
forensic hospital that is responsible for corrections-based mental 
health treatment in New York State prisons.22  The predicament at 
the CNYPC is a reflection of a nationwide crisis.23 
Activists, advocates, and lawyers have played a major role in 
responding to this crisis and improving psychiatric treatment in New 
York’s prisons over the last several decades.24  For example, lawyers 
from Disability Advocates, Inc., Prisoners’ Legal Services of New 
York, and the Prisoners’ Rights Project of The Legal Aid Society of 
New York City negotiated a private settlement agreement in 
Disability Advocates, Inc. v. New York State Office of Mental 
Health,25 expanding the circumscribed mental health services options 
in New York State prisons and increasing services for people with 
serious mental health needs housed in twenty-three-hour-per-day 
solitary confinement.26  Although that settlement agreement has since 
expired, it led to the implementation of the Special Housing Unit 
                                                                                                                 
 18. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH 
MENTAL ILLNESS 19 (2003), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/usa1003.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q26F-CQHJ]. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Robert D. Morgan et al., Treating Offenders with Mental Illness: A Research 
Synthesis, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 37 (2012). 
 22. MARY BETH PFEIFFER, CRAZY IN AMERICA: THE HIDDEN TRAGEDY OF OUR 
CRIMINALIZED MENTALLY ILL 193 (2007). 
 23. Morgan et al., supra note 21, at 37 (“[T]reatment efforts for offenders with 
mental illness have been unable to keep pace with the incarceration rates in state and 
federal jail and prison facilities.  In fact, the U.S. correctional systems have been 
criticized for failing to provide even minimally appropriate mental health services for 
prison inmates.”). 
 24. See discussion infra Parts I and II. 
 25. See generally Private Settlement Agreement, Disability Advocates, Inc. v. 
N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, No. 02 Civ. 4002 (GEL) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2007) 
[hereinafter Private Settlement Agreement]. 
 26. Id. 
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(“SHU”) Exclusion Law,27 a New York State law that codified the 
expansion of treatment options and units for incarcerated individuals 
with serious mental health needs.28  Among other requirements, the 
SHU Exclusion Law requires the New York State Department of 
Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”)—the agency 
that operates all New York State prisons—to “divert or remove 
inmates with serious mental illness . . . from [twenty-three-hour-per-
day solitary confinement] when the period of [solitary confinement] 
could potentially be [longer than] thirty days.”29  As a result, people 
with serious mental health needs—who, studies show, are far more 
susceptible to mental deterioration in solitary confinement—are 
diverted to a more treatment-rich environment.30  Apart from the 
SHU Exclusion Law, the Constitution mandates that DOCCS and 
OMH provide mental health treatment to all other individuals with 
serious mental health needs, including mental health assessments by 
trained clinicians.31 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Provisions of the law are codified as amendments to N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 553.24 
(McKinney 2017) and N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 2, 137.6, 401, 401-a (McKinney 2017). 
 28. See generally sources cited supra note 27. 
 29. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 137.6(d)(i). 
 30. See discussion infra Part I; see also Fatos Kaba et al., Solitary Confinement 
and Risk of Self-Harm Among Jail Inmates, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 442, 445 (2014) 
(finding that people who were punished by solitary confinement were approximately 
6.9 times as likely to commit acts of self-harm); Joshua Manson, New Report 
Documents Devastating Effects of Solitary Confinement on Mental Illness, 
SOLITARY WATCH (Sept. 9, 2016), http://solitarywatch.com/2016/09/09/new-report-
documents-devastating-effects-of-solitary-confinement-on-mental-illness/ 
[https://perma.cc/3LJT-J9UU] (explaining solitary confinement’s acute impact upon 
individuals with preexisting mental health needs). 
 31. See generally NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, STANDARDS FOR 
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES (2015). See also Brown v. 
Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011) (upholding a lower court population cap order under 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act based in part on California’s longstanding 
unconstitutional failure to provide needed mental health treatment and “specifically 
the severe and unlawful mistreatment of prisoners through grossly inadequate 
provision of medical and mental health care”).  Prior to Plata, courts assumed that 
psychiatric care was included in medical care for Eighth Amendment purposes, but 
the issue had not been addressed at the Supreme Court level. See Langley v. 
Coughlin, 888 F.2d 252, 254 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that “psychiatric or mental health 
care is an integral part of medical care.  It thus falls within the requirement of Estelle 
v. Gamble that it must be provided to prisoners.  The difference between the two 
varieties of care are simply factual and administrative”); see also Eng v. Smith, 849 
F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding preliminary injunction on Eighth Amendment 
claim based on deliberate indifference to mental health treatment needs); Bowring v. 
Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that there was “no underlying 
distinction between the right to medical care for physical ills and its psychological or 
psychiatric counterpart”).  Courts have since distinguished between “serious medical 
needs” and “serious mental health needs” for the purpose of Eighth Amendment 
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A memorandum of understanding between DOCCS and OMH 
details how the agencies work together to serve the needs of the 
population.32  Services are delivered primarily through mental health 
satellite units, which are units within the prisons providing mental 
health treatment.33  Each satellite unit is headed by a mental health 
unit chief and is additionally staffed by nurses, social workers, and 
psychiatrists.34 
Almost all New York State prisons with mental health satellite 
units support local economies and serve as economic anchor 
institutions in fiscally depressed communities far from New York 
City’s population center.35  These prisons provide well-paying jobs in 
communities without many other employment options and maintain 
generational wealth through retirement packages and union 
protections.36  Although a boon to local economies, the location of 
these prisons and the satellite units in them—specifically their 
geographic isolation—has negatively affected the quality of mental 
health care provided to incarcerated people.37  For years, rural and 
suburban New York counties have experienced psychiatrist shortages: 
                                                                                                                 
deliberate indifference claims.  For more on that distinction, see discussion on the 
Eighth Amendment framework infra Part II. 
 32. See generally Memorandum of Understanding between the New York State 
Office of Mental Health and the New York State Department of Corrections and 
Community Supervision (Sept. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Memorandum of 
Understanding] (on file with author). 
 33. Id. at 3–4. See generally N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, Directive 
# 4301: Mental Health Satellite Services and Commitments to CNYPC (Aug. 18, 
2015) [hereinafter DOCCS Directive # 4301] (on file with author). 
 34. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 32, at 7–8. 
 35. See, e.g., Ken Stier, NYS Prison Budget Climbs, Despite Fewer Inmates, CITY 
LIMITS (Nov. 10, 2015), https://citylimits.org/2015/11/10/nys-prison-budget-climbs-
despite-fewer-inmates/ [https://perma.cc/C6L7-3A2W] (“‘These are great, living-wage 
jobs in an area like Ogdensburg, in an area like Lyon Mountain, in an area like Lake 
Saranac,’ exclaims Mike Powers, president of the New York State Correctional 
Officer and Police Benevolent Association (NYSCOPBA), which represents 26,000 
officers and retirees, most of whom live upstate, about or around the New York 
Thruway where there are few other well-paid jobs not requiring higher education 
levels.  He makes no apology for aggressively working to retain as many of those 
posts as possible.”).  Only two of New York’s fifteen prison units for individuals with 
serious mental illness are located in the New York City region.  Almost all of the 
remaining thirteen units are located in rural areas with physician shortages. See 
discussion infra Part II. 
 36. See Stier, supra note 35. 
 37. See Joel A. Dvoskin et al., The Structure of Correctional Mental Health 
Services, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 489, 496 (Richard 
Rosner ed., 2d ed. 2003) (“Complications surrounding geographic isolation and 
limited access to mental health professionals familiar with the correctional setting 
may, at times, compromise care for inmates.”). 
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for example, in 2017, fifty-four of sixty-two counties in the state 
reported shortages.38  As such, the prison mental health satellite units 
in certain rural regions of New York State are under-staffed because 
DOCCS and OMH have difficulty hiring mental health clinicians in 
under-resourced, remote parts of the state that are experiencing those 
shortages.39 
Due to the dearth of qualified mental health clinicians in rural 
communities, DOCCS and OMH extensively utilize a video 
teleconferencing (“VTC”) model40 for the provision of outpatient 
mental health services in many of the satellite units.41  Psychiatrists 
assess individuals through VTC to determine whether individuals who 
have reported a mental health crisis should be removed from suicide 
watch or discharged from an observation cell.42  Individuals 
incarcerated in New York State prisons are often assessed for their 
mental health condition—and even for their suicide risk—via VTC.43  
Individuals who receive ongoing mental health services, known as 
“being on the OMH case load,” also receive treatment from 
psychiatrists via VTC.44  That treatment includes regular VTC 
appointments with individuals for the purpose of assessing mental 
health status, evaluating treatment regimens, and determining 
whether medications need to be adjusted.45  Many correctional 
agencies throughout the nation have championed VTC as a method 
of responding to resource issues.46 
                                                                                                                 
 38. UNIV. OF THE STATE OF N.Y., REGENTS DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN SHORTAGE 
AREAS IN NEW YORK STATE 3–15 (2017). 
 39. Id. at 22. 
 40. “VTC” is often referred to in a mental health context as “telepsychiatry,” 
“telepsych,” or “tele-mental health.”  For the purposes of this Article, “VTC” 
encompasses all these terms. 
 41. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 32, at 7 (“In OMH Level 1 
Satellite Units, there is a full time Unit Chief/Coordinator, and clinical staff working 
on site Monday through Friday sufficient to meet the needs of the mental health 
caseload.  Under normal conditions there will be full time psychiatric coverage, by a 
psychiatrist or psychiatric nurse practitioner, either on site or by video 
teleconferencing.”). 
 42. See Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 4.2: 
Suicide Watches 1–2 (June 1, 2016) (on file with author); Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., 
Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 2.9: Psychiatric Evaluation and Treatment via 
Video Tele-Conference (VTC) 1–2 (June 2016) [hereinafter CBO Policy # 2.9] (on 
file with author). 
 43. CBO Policy # 2.9, supra note 42, at 1–2. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Michael Ollove, State Prisons Turn to Telemedicine to Improve Health and 
Save Money, PEW CHARITABLE TRS.: STATELINE BLOG (Jan. 21, 2016), 
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Due to the geographic isolation of prisons and the resulting dearth 
of adequate local psychiatric services, DOCCS and OMH rely too 
heavily on VTC at the expense of the mental health of incarcerated 
persons.  VTC is best suited to supplement, not supplant, in-person 
mental health services; it has been criticized as an ineffective medium 
for establishing trust and efficacy between clinicians and patients, and 
assessments performed by VTC may be unreliable or perfunctory.47  
Unfortunately, DOCCS and OMH have, in some cases, used it as a 
primary vehicle for the provision of mental health services in many 
state prisons, exacerbating the geographic isolation and psychosocial 
burden upon individuals with mental health needs incarcerated in 
those prisons.48  Overreliance on VTC is merely one symptom of an 
overburdened prison mental health delivery system based in locations 
without sufficient resources. 
Mental health treatment provided in New York State prisons will 
continue to suffer so long as prisons are sited in geographically 
isolated areas of the state.  Unfortunately, decision makers in 
DOCCS, OMH, the governor’s office, and the State Legislature have 
not acknowledged that reality.  Geographic isolation and resulting 
resource issues are virtual non-factors in New York’s discourse 
around prison siting and prison closures.  That omission reveals 
gubernatorial, legislative, and agency priorities—state actors have 
prioritized supporting rural economies over tackling the geographic 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/01/21/state-
prisons-turn-to-telemedicine-to-improve [https://perma.cc/UZK3-WDNX]. 
 47. See, e.g., Donald M. Hilty et al., Clinical and Educational Telepsychiatry 
Applications: A Review, 49 CAN. J. PSYCH. 12, 16 (2004) (finding that “[c]onsultee 
(that is, nurse, psychologist, or other) satisfaction with telepsychiatry was lower than 
satisfaction with in-person consultation in terms of ease with the process, ability to 
express oneself, and quality of interpersonal relationships . . . . One concern with 
telemedicine is that the technology may adversely affect communication and the 
development of a positive therapeutic alliance.  Decreased ability to detect nonverbal 
cues in patient interviews has been reported during videoconferencing, which may 
limit mutual connections and understanding.  In a physical environment, 
informational cues are incorporated without conscious awareness . . . the virtual 
environment created by telemedicine may differ . . . ”); see also Jeannine Monnier et 
al., Recent Advances in Telepsychiatry: An Updated Review, 54 PSYCH. SERVS. 1604, 
1607 (2003) (citing studies that find that “telepsychiatric methods are not appealing 
to those providing treatment because these methods are perceived to make 
communication difficult and interfere with the therapeutic relationship”). 
 48. See Joseph Berger, In Sing Sing’s Hometown, Many Dream of Day ‘the Big 
House’ Closes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/
nyregion/in-sing-sings-hometown-dreams-of-inmates-leaving-for-good.html 
[https://nyti.ms/2yCxiLk] (noting that New York City-based lawmakers and 
advocates have emphasized the need for incarcerated individuals to maintain family 
ties, a problem when prisons are located “hundreds of miles away”). 
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issue that stands in the way of delivering robust mental health 
treatment to incarcerated individuals.  This is a stark choice given the 
studies that find a lower recidivism rate among those who receive 
treatment while incarcerated.49 
Governor Cuomo has initiated the closure of minimum- and 
medium-security prisons to address budget issues, but has never 
proposed closing a large, maximum-security prison with a mental 
health satellite unit to address the failure of mental health treatment 
in such facilities.50  His administration has never proposed moving 
mental health satellite units to better-resourced areas of the state to 
foster the provision of more robust, in-person mental health 
treatment.  This omission is almost certainly not attributable to lack 
of knowledge on Governor Cuomo’s part, as one of his most prized 
executive agencies, the New York Justice Center for the Protection of 
People with Special Needs, has decried the poor mental health 
treatment in New York’s prisons and attributed that poor treatment 
to resources deficiencies.51  Governor Cuomo’s omission may be due, 
in part, to pushback from state lawmakers.  When Governor Cuomo 
decided to close minimum- and medium-security prisons in rural 
areas of the state, lawmakers responded by assailing the governor for 
one potential result—loss of jobs and damage to the local economy.52  
It is safe to assume that the governor would face more vigorous 
pushback against any proposal to close a maximum-security prison, as 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Morgan et al., supra note 21, at 37. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Governor Cuomo created the New York Justice Center for the Protection of 
People with Special Needs in response to federal government findings that its 
predecessor, the New York State Commission on Quality of Care and Advocacy for 
Persons with Disabilities, was inadequate. Press Release, Office of the Governor, 
Governor Cuomo Announces Opening of the Justice Center for the Protection of 
People with Special Needs (June 29, 2013), https://www.governor.ny.gov/
news/governor-cuomo-announces-opening-justice-center-protection-people-special-
needs [https://perma.cc/4RKA-2RMJ].  The Justice Center has since found that 
DOCCS and OMH have failed to provide robust care to people with mental health 
needs incarcerated in state prisons, in part due to resources issues. See discussion 
infra Part II. 
 52. State Senator Betty Little has often complained about job loss due to prison 
closures. See, e.g., Paul Post, Closed Prisons in Rural Areas Are a Tough Sell, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/nyregion/closed-prisons-
new-york.html [https://nyti.ms/2ojPfMl] (“When the decision is made to close a 
prison in a rural community, that community loses hundreds of jobs that aren’t going 
to be absorbed by the private sector . . . .  It’s a huge blow that someone from a 
populated area of New York State wouldn’t understand.”). 
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such facilities are larger than minimum- and medium-security 
facilities and provide greater economic benefits.53 
The political paradigm therefore remains.  The discourse around 
prison closures and prison siting in New York State remains intensely 
focused on the needs of small, rural communities rather than the 
needs of incarcerated individuals, particularly those with mental 
health needs.  The conversation has steadfastly omitted difficulties 
recruiting and retaining mental health staff to meet the needs of 
incarcerated individuals in those rural communities, and the resulting 
impact on rehabilitation.  Advocacy organizations such as the 
Correctional Association of New York and the Alliance of Families 
for Justice have repeatedly called for the closure of large prisons in 
rural areas and the re-directing of resources to facilities closer to large 
population centers where more humane treatment is feasible.54  This 
Article argues that due to the convergence of the above-mentioned 
social phenomena, this is the only way to improve mental health 
treatment in New York State prisons. 
Part I of this Article provides a brief history of the 
deinstitutionalization movement and its impact upon the 
development of an infrastructure for psychiatric care in the New York 
State prison system.  Part I also evaluates the effectiveness of that 
system’s use of VTC as a response to resource and geographic issues 
affecting the quality of psychiatric care.  Part II provides an overview 
of the dearth of Eighth Amendment litigation involving VTC, and 
posits that Eighth Amendment litigation is an inadequate vehicle 
through which to address VTC and other resource problems 
attendant to the provision of mental health treatment in rural prisons.  
Part III argues that, in addition to any litigation strategy, activists, 
advocates, and movement lawyers must build on an already existing 
grassroots movement to shrink the prison population and shift 
psychiatric resources and incarcerated persons in need of such 
resources to facilities near urban centers.  The widespread use of 
                                                                                                                 
 53. But cf. DANA KAPLAN, IMPACTS OF JAIL EXPANSION IN NEW YORK STATE: A 
HIDDEN BURDEN 1 (2007) https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/ImpactsofJail
Expansion_NYS.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NSS-JSSC] (explaining the costs of prison 
construction as opposed to the economic benefits borne by the communities in which 
prisons are located). 
 54. Current Topic: Close Attica, CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., 
http://www.correctionalassociation.org/current_topics/attica [https://perma.cc/7ABP-
ELX4]; March for Justice: From New York City to Albany!, ALL. OF FAMILIES FOR 
JUSTICE (Apr. 27, 2017), https://afj-ny.org/blog/2017/4/27/march-for-justice-from-
harlem-to-state-house-in-albany [https://perma.cc/C9T6-Q25W]. 
2018] GRASSROOTS CHALLENGES 449 
VTC in prisons is reflective of a fundamental geographic problem 
and, as such, requires a geographic solution. 
I.  DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND RESULTING DEFICIENCIES IN 
NEW YORK’S PRISON MENTAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
As explained above, the deinstitutionalization and “law and order” 
movements unintentionally caused a large increase in the number of 
individuals with mental health needs in prisons.  In response to that 
increase, DOCCS and OMH have changed their corrections-based 
mental health treatment modalities and increased the number of 
prison-based units that provide mental health treatment.55  Despite 
those changes, need has far outstripped resources.56  As a result, 
DOCCS and OMH rely heavily on VTC.57  Part I provides an 
overview of the results of the deinstitutionalization movement,58 the 
subsequent changes in DOCCS and OMH’s mental health care 
delivery system,59 and an explanation of DOCCS and OMH’s use of 
VTC.60  Part I ultimately concludes that deficiencies in VTC have 
combined with other factors to cause poor outcomes for people with 
mental health needs.  Due to VTC’s deficiencies, DOCCS and OMH 
should not rely on VTC to improve mental health treatment in state 
prisons.  That improvement will come only after the agencies reckon 
with underlying geographic and resources problems. 
A. An Abridged History of the Deinstitutionalization Movement 
Though many critics consider the deinstitutionalization movement 
to have been a “disaster” because of its inability to achieve more 
robust community integration of individuals with mental health 
needs, the facts paint a far more complicated picture.61  The 
deinstitutionalization movement was certainly a partial success in that 
it caused a drastic decrease in the number of individuals with mental 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See discussion infra Section I.B. 
 56. See discussion infra Section I.B. 
 57. See discussion infra Section I.B. 
 58. See discussion infra Section I.A. 
 59. See discussion infra Section I.B. 
 60. See discussion infra Section I.B. 
 61. See generally E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING 
AMERICA’S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS (1998) (identifying systemic flaws in America’s 
mental health treatment model and linking those flaws to failures of the 
deinstitutionalization movement); Amitai Etzioni, “Deinstitutionalization”: A Public 
Policy Fashion, 3 EVALUATION, no. 2, 1976, at 9; Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing 
Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the Deinstitutionalization of Mental Hospitals in 
the 1960s, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 53, 54 (2011). 
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health needs confined to institutional settings.62  In 1955, the number 
of individuals in large psychiatric hospitals peaked at approximately 
560,000 individuals.63  As of 2012, that number had dropped to 
approximately 50,400, around nine percent of what it was at its peak, 
and continued to drop.64  This was a great achievement, as it removed 
individuals from dilapidated and under-resourced facilities to, in some 
cases, community alternatives.65 
However, deinstitutionalization also came at a cost to some 
individuals with mental health needs.  The overriding criticism of the 
deinstitutionalization movement focuses on its incompleteness.66  
Although deinstitutionalization brought down the raw number of 
individuals with serious mental health needs confined to institutions, 
it also shifted a significant portion of that population onto the streets 
and into jails and prisons, due largely to an increase in arrests for 
manifestations of mental health needs.67  As Professor Bagenstos 
writes, “there is . . . little doubt that, in the wake of 
deinstitutionalization, a significant number of people were left to fend 
for themselves.”68  As a result, today nearly fifteen percent of men 
and thirty percent of women booked into jails nationwide have a 
serious mental health need.69 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Fisher et al., supra note 1, at 676 (“State hospitals were once the most 
prominent components of U.S. public mental health systems.  But a major focus of 
mental health policy over the past fifty years has been to close these facilities.  These 
efforts led to a 95 percent reduction in the country’s state hospital population.”). 
 63. See TORREY, supra note 61, at 9; Harcourt, supra note 61, at 54. 
 64. See TORREY, supra note 61, at 9; Harcourt, supra note 61, at 54. 
 65. See generally Ronald W. Manderscheid et al., Changing Trends in State 
Psychiatric Hospital Use from 2002 to 2005, 60 PSYCH. SERVS. 29 (2009). 
 66. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 3; Michael L. Perlin, Competency, 
Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 HOUS. L. 
REV. 63, 94–97 (1991). 
 67. BRENDAN O’FLAHERTY, MAKING ROOM: THE ECONOMICS OF HOMELESSNESS 
235 (1998) (“After 1975, the movement out of state and county mental hospitals was 
more than offset by the movement into nursing homes and correctional institutions, 
and after 1980 homelessness rose among mentally ill because housing conditions got 
worse.”); E. Fuller Torrey, Jails and Prisons—America’s New Mental Hospitals, 
85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1611, 1611 (1995) (“Quietly but steadily, jails and prisons are 
replacing public mental hospitals as the primary purveyors of public psychiatric 
services for individuals with serious mental illnesses in the United States.”); Jailing 
People with Mental Illness, NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, https://www.nami.org/
Learn-More/Public-Policy/Jailing-People-with-Mental-Illness [https://perma.cc/7S8E-
ZYFP] (“In a mental health crisis, people are more likely to encounter police than 
get medical help.  As a result, 2 million people with mental illness are booked into 
jails each year.  Nearly 15% of men and 30% of women booked into jails have a 
serious mental health condition.”). 
 68. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 3. 
 69. Jailing People with Mental Illness, supra note 67. 
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The movement’s failure to achieve more robust community 
integration rather than a shift in the type of institutionalization was 
not driven by flawed movement strategies and tactics.  Instead, it was 
driven by the failure of the federal government and local and state 
governments to devote the necessary resources to establishing a true 
community-based treatment model for individuals with serious 
mental health needs.70  Many of the programs that benefited 
individuals with mental health needs, most notably those authorized 
specifically to effectuate deinstitutionalization, were not fully 
implemented or were entirely eliminated under a succession of 
several presidential administrations.  In some cases, the executive 
branch scuttled those programs by failing to spend the monies 
Congress authorized to fund them. 
The Nixon Administration, for example, refused to expend $289.5 
million of the $340 million authorized to support community mental 
health centers and mental health research initiatives between 1970 
and 1973.71  That funding had been authorized as an extension of, and 
an amendment to, the Community Mental Health Act of 1963.72  
President Ford, after succeeding President Nixon in scandal, vetoed 
an expansion of that Act.73  That veto was later overridden74 and 
although the law survived under President Carter after two 
reauthorizations, expenditures remained meager.75 
                                                                                                                 
 70. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 18, at 20. 
 71. James M. Cameron, A National Community Mental Health Program: Policy 
Inflation and Progress, in HANDBOOK ON MENTAL HEALTH POLICY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 121 (David A. Rochefort ed., 1989).  Prior to Congress’s passage of the 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §§ 601–688, and the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of that Act in Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 
(1976), presidents maintained virtually unbridled authority to impound—or refuse to 
spend—monies appropriated by Congress.  President Nixon impounded with 
impunity. See generally Gerald A. Figurski, Presidential Impoundment of Funds: A 
Constitutional Crisis, 7 AKRON L. REV. 107 (1974).  Presidents now maintain a 
circumscribed power to interfere with the executive branch’s expenditure of 
appropriated funds.  Some scholars maintain that such interference runs afoul of the 
Constitution’s “Take Care Clause.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.  For a more robust 
explanation of the presidential power, as it exists today, to interfere with 
expenditures, see generally David E. Lewis, Political Control and the Presidential 
Spending Power (Vanderbilt Univ. Ctr. Study of Democratic Insts., Working Paper 
No. 1, 2017), https://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/includes/WP_1_2017_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9JJ9-AJSH]. 
 72. See generally Community Mental Health Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 
Stat. 282 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 73. Health Bill OKd in Congress: Ford Veto Is Upset 1st Time in ‘75, CHI. 
TRIBUNE, July 30, 1975, at 6. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See generally id. 
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After President Carter’s Commission on Mental Health produced a 
preliminary and later final report that nominally supported 
deinstitutionalization,76 Congress passed another law, the Mental 
Health Systems Act of 1980, to support such efforts.77  That law was 
never implemented, however, as Congress largely repealed it during 
the heady early days of the Reagan Administration.78  In the bill 
repealing the Mental Health Systems Act of 1980, Congress also 
block-granted to the states the remaining money authorized by the 
Community Mental Health Act of 1963, thus transferring 
responsibility for the implementation of mental health services and 
programming to state governments.79  Over the next decade, most 
states developed what are best termed “minimum benefit mental 
health [programs],”80 and passed legislation—most of which was not 
ambitious—to fund only basic necessities for individuals with mental 
health needs.81  Most of the community mental health centers 
authorized by Congress were never built.82 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Gerald N. Grob, Public Policy and Mental Illnesses: Jimmy Carter’s 
Presidential Commission on Mental Health, 83 MILBANK Q. 425, 442 (2005) (“The 
report affirmed a commitment to the goal of making high-quality mental health care 
at reasonable cost available to all who needed it. Personal and community supports 
had to be strengthened, and a responsible mental health service system had to be 
created that provided the most appropriate care in a least restrictive setting.  The 
report endorsed a federal program designed to encourage the creation of new 
community mental health services, particularly in underserved areas.”). 
 77. See generally The Mental Health Systems Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-398 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (repealed 1981). 
 78. See generally The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-35 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 79. See Cameron, supra note 71, at 121.  This was but one tactic in the Reagan 
Administration’s new federalism/devolution strategy, which initiated a swift and 
radical transfer of power from the federal government to state governments.  New 
federalism/devolution, which was based on an overbroad reading of the Tenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, unsurprisingly harmed traditionally 
marginalized groups that relied on federal government intervention to secure basic 
civil rights.  For an illustration of the manner in which “new federalism” harmed 
traditionally marginalized groups, specifically African-Americans, the working class, 
and the poor, see generally Anthony Cook, The Ghosts of 1964: Race, Reagan, and 
the Neo-Conservative Backlash to the Civil Rights Movement, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. 
REV. 81 (2015). 
 80. Olga Loraine Kofman, Deinstitutionalization and Its Discontents: American 
Mental Health Policy Reform 38 (2012) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Claremont 
McKenna College), http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1348
&context=cmc_theses [https://perma.cc/JS74-9ERH]. 
 81. Id. at 33. 
 82. See generally Michelle R. Smith, 50 Years Later, Kennedy’s Vision for Mental 
Health Not Realized, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 20, 2013), https://www.seattletimes.com/
nation-world/50-years-later-kennedyrsquos-vision-for-mental-health-not-realized/ 
[https://perma.cc/B4T7-DVYX]. 
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Between this shift of responsibility to the states and cuts to 
preexisting social safety net programs during the 1980s and 1990s, the 
federal government essentially abdicated its role in promoting 
community integration.83  Not until the 1990s and the passage of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) were individuals with 
mental health needs the focus of any major federal legislative 
efforts.84  Even then, the ADA is largely rights-based, not services-
based.85  In 1990, the Public Citizen Health Research Group and the 
National Alliance for the Mentally Ill conducted a nationwide study 
and found that public psychiatric services were in “near total 
breakdown,” both underfunded and understaffed.86 
Left with the major responsibility, state governments did little.87  
New York is very much a microcosm of the national trend away from 
confining individuals with serious mental health needs to psychiatric 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See Michael L. Perlin, Book Reviews, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 557, 568 
(1991). 
 84. See generally SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF POLICY, TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY AND SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME DISABILITY PROGRAMS 73–81 
(2006), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/disability_trends/trends.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W3ST-BFLG]. 
 85. A rights-based statute, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), is one that 
guarantees a group’s basic civil legal rights.  The Americans with Disabilities Act 
fulfilled that function for people with disabilities. See generally An Overview of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, ADA NAT’L NETWORK (2017), https://adata.org/
sites/adata.org/files/files/ADA_overview_final2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/DUT5-625U].  
Because of the ADA, people with disabilities can access services and public 
accommodations to which non-disabled people have always had access.  By contrast, 
a services-based statute, like the Community Mental Health Act of 1963, provides an 
entitlement to, or appropriates funds for, a service for a marginalized group.  In the 
case of the Community Mental Health Act of 1963, those services were community 
health centers.  Rights-based statutes create legal parity between traditionally 
marginalized groups and their privileged counterparts.  Services-based statutes, by 
contrast, expand entitlements in an affirmative attempt at equity.  As such, they are 
usually more ambitious. 
 86. See Phillip J. Hilts, U.S. Returns to 1820’s in Care of Mentally Ill, Study 
Asserts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/12/us/us-
returns-to-1820-s-in-care-of-mentally-ill-study-asserts.html [https://perma.cc/F29D-
9NCL]. 
 87. Kofman, supra note 80, at 32 (“States were not pleased to support mental 
health programs and little more than custodial care was provided.  Major gaps in 
service were never addressed, particularly the lack of rehabilitative and aftercare 
services for the chronically mentally ill.  Poor coordination between state hospitals 
and community mental health centers also made continuous care for the chronically 
mentally ill patchy at best.  Worse yet, states divested themselves of responsibility for 
the mentally ill by transferring patients to private nursing homes or board-and-care 
facilities away from state facilities as a result of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
and Medicaid offering financial support . . . .  The seriously mentally disabled were 
quietly ignored . . . .”). 
454 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
institutions and toward confining them in prisons.88  As a result of a 
great increase in the sheer numbers of individuals incarcerated in the 
state of New York throughout the 1980s and 1990s,89 and the number 
of those individuals who came into the system with mental health 
needs,90 DOCCS bolstered its mental health services system.91  That 
shift occurred in part so that DOCCS and OMH could avoid Eighth 
Amendment92 or medical malpractice liability for the failure to 
provide those individuals with constitutionally mandated medical—
and now mental health—treatment.93  The shift mirrored similar shifts 
in the medical care priorities of corrections agencies across the 
country.94 
B. The Scope of the System and the Availability of Mental Health 
Treatment in New York State Prisons 
Integral to understanding the way that geographic factors and lack 
of resources have undermined the efficacy of mental health treatment 
in New York State prisons is understanding the full scope of the 
system and the nature of the programs and therapy it provides.  
Mental health treatment in DOCCS is provided by OMH through 
CNYPC, which provides inpatient treatment at its hospital in Marcy, 
New York, and outpatient treatment at state prisons.95  All 
                                                                                                                 
 88. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 18, at 19. See generally KACEY 
HEEKIN & LARRY POLIVKA, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND MENTAL HEALTH 
(2015), http://coss.fsu.edu/subdomains/claudepeppercenter.fsu.edu_wp/wp-content/
uploads/2016/02/The-Criminal-Justice-System-and-Mental-Health.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/569N-F2H4]; Michael Winerip & Michael Schwirtz, For Mentally Ill 
Inmates at Rikers Island, a Cycle of Jail and Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/12/nyregion/for-mentally-ill-inmates-at-rikers-a-
cycle-of-jail-and-hospitals.html [https://nyti.ms/2jBuiYF]. 
 89. See discussion supra Introduction. 
 90. See discussion supra Introduction. 
 91. Lisa W. Foderaro, The Mentally Ill Overwhelm New York’s Prisons,  
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/06/us/the-mentally-ill-
overwhelm-new-york-s-prisons.html [https://perma.cc/3G3H-ULFF]. 
 92. For a fuller explanation of the Eighth Amendment’s applicability to prison 
mental health care, see discussion infra Section II.A. 
 93. See, e.g., Stipulation, Eng v. Goord, No. 80 Civ. 385S (W.D.N.Y. June 12, 
2000) (barring DOCCS and OMH from placing individuals with serious mental 
illness in solitary confinement at certain state prisons and mandating procedures for 
assessing suicide risk and guaranteeing quality of mental health treatment). 
 94. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CALLOUS AND CRUEL: USE OF FORCE 
AGAINST INMATES WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES IN US JAILS AND PRISONS (2015), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usprisoner0515_ForUpload.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T5M8-YQYL] (discussing the evolution of the provision of mental 
health care in United States prisons and the quality of that care). 
 95. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 32, at 10–12. 
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incarcerated individuals are screened for mental health treatment 
needs as part of the DOCCS reception process.96  Incarcerated 
individuals can also request mental health services during their 
incarceration, though many complain that those requests are not 
always met.97  Where necessary, incarcerated individuals can be 
voluntarily or involuntarily transferred from a state prison to 
CNYPC.98  Involuntary commitment to a hospital occurs through the 
“two physician certificate” process outlined in New York Mental 
Hygiene Law section 9.27.99  OMH also utilizes an emergency 
admissions procedure where a patient is an imminent danger to 
themselves or others and therefore requires a heightened level of care 
in shorter order than is feasible through the “two physician 
certificate” process.100 
Each individual whom OMH and DOCCS have identified as 
requiring mental health treatment at reception or during some other 
point in their incarceration is designated a mental health “service 
level” pursuant to OMH policy.101  OMH can change this service level 
based upon the person’s acuity, or severity of their symptoms.102  
There are five OMH service levels—one, two, three, four, and six.103  
A person designated service level six has been identified as “not in 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Id. at 10; see also Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., Corrections-Based Operations 
Policy # 1.2: Reception Mental Health Screening 1–3 (Apr. 8, 2015) (on file with 
author); Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 2.0: 
Screened – Admitted to Services 1–3 (June 1, 2016) (on file with author). 
 97. See DOCCS Directive # 4301, supra note 33, at 3–5; N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. & 
Cmty. Supervision, Form # 3150: Mental Health Referral (July 2016) (on file with 
author); Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 1.3: 
Mental Health Referrals 1–2 (May 20, 2016) (on file with author). 
 98. See DOCCS Directive # 4301, supra note 33, at 9–10. 
 99. See generally N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27 (McKinney 2017). 
 100. Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 7.4: 
Admissions to Inpatient Services 1, 4–5 (May 13, 2014) (on file with author).  In the 
emergency procedure, where a patient is “mentally ill and dangerous to self or others 
and requires immediate transfer to an inpatient facility,” the two physician certificate 
process proceeds, but without the court order requirement imposed under normal 
circumstances. Id.; see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39 (McKinney 2017); N.Y. 
CORRECT. LAW § 402 (McKinney 2017). 
 101. See Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 1.12: 
Mental Health Service Level 1 (May 20, 2016) [hereinafter CBO Policy # 1.12] (on 
file with author); Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., Treatment Needs/Service Level 
Designation (Outpatient) 167 MED CNYPC (Mar. 2012) [hereinafter MED 
CNYPC] (on file with author). 
 102. See CBO Policy # 1.12, supra note 101, at 1; Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., 
Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 9.12: Treatment Needs/Service Level 
Designation Form 1–3 (May 6, 2015) [hereinafter CBO Policy # 9.12] (on file with 
author); MED CNYPC, supra note 101. 
 103. CBO Policy # 9.12, supra note 102, at 1–3. 
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need of services” and is therefore not on the OMH case load.104  An 
individual who has been designated service level one is considered in 
highest need of treatment.105  Individuals with serious mental health 
needs, as defined in New York state law as opposed to simply OMH 
policy, receive a 1-S or 2-S designation (referred to as “S-
designation”).106 
OMH also assigns each state prison a service level, which denotes 
the number and type of OMH staff and clinical space available to 
meet the treatment needs of incarcerated individuals.107  Because not 
every prison has the staff or resources to serve high-need individuals, 
those individuals with a service level one, two, three, or four, or an S-
designation may only be housed at prisons with a corresponding 
service level.108  In practice, this means that individuals with an S-
designation cannot be housed at a level three facility, because such 
facility does not have the necessary resources to treat that 
individual.109 
In addition to affording specified treatment to individuals based 
upon their particular service level, DOCCS and OMH afford certain 
people access to specialized units in which more intensive mental 
health treatment is provided.110  Those units grew out of a 
combination of forward-thinking action by DOCCS and OMH, 
litigation, legislation, and grassroots mobilization by advocates and 
activists.111  Such a specialized unit that serves individuals with serious 
                                                                                                                 
 104. CBO Policy # 1.12, supra note 101, at 1. 
 105. CBO Policy # 9.12, supra note 102, at 1–3. 
 106. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 137(6)(d)–(e) (McKinney 2017).  State law defines 
persons with “serious mental illness” as “individuals who meet criteria established by 
the commissioner of mental health, which shall include persons who are in psychiatric 
crisis, or persons who have a designated diagnosis of mental illness under the most 
recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and 
whose severity and duration of mental illness results in substantial functional 
disability.” N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 1.03(52) (McKinney 2017); see also Cent. N.Y. 
Psychiatric Ctr., Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 1.13: Serious Mental Illness 
Designation 1–5 (Mar. 16, 2015) (on file with author). 
 107. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, Directive # 4302: Transfers to 
Health/Mental Health Care Units 7 (May 9, 2017) [hereinafter DOCCS Directive 
# 4302] (on file with author); see also CBO Policy # 1.12, supra note 101, at 1. 
 108. DOCCS Directive # 4302, supra note 107, at 7. 
 109. See id. (noting that individuals are “assigned to facilities where that level of 
service is available”). 
 110. Id. at 4–6. 
 111. For example, in 2016, DOCCS and OMH expanded treatment options for 
people with histories of mental health-related violence of their own volition, rather 
than in response to litigation.  For more information on those units, see discussion 
concerning the Discharge and Enhanced Intermediate Care Programs infra 
Section I.B.  As mentioned above, however, DOCCS and OMH did not expand 
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mental health needs is called a Residential Mental Health Treatment 
Unit (“RMHTU”).112  The RMHTUs are organized into two types.  
The first type of RMHTU serves individuals who would otherwise be 
housed in general population, or those who do not have solitary 
confinement sanctions of any type.113  Those units are called the 
Intermediate Care Program,114 Transitional Intermediate Care 
                                                                                                                 
treatment options for people with S-designations housed in solitary confinement until 
it settled civil rights litigation. See Private Settlement Agreement, supra note 25, at 3–
7.  DOCCS and OMH did not make many of those options permanent until the SHU 
Exclusion Law was codified. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 553.24 (McKinney 2017); N.Y. 
CORRECT. LAW §§ 2, 137.6, 401 & 401-a (McKinney 2017).  The SHU Exclusion Law 
was codified largely due to advocacy by Mental Health Alternatives to Solitary 
Confinement, a grassroots advocacy organization dedicated to the development of 
therapeutic approaches to mental health crises in the DOCCS system.  For more 
information about Mental Health Alternatives to Solitary Confinement and its push 
for the SHU Exclusion Law, see generally Reassessing Solitary Confinement: The 
Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety Consequences, Hearing Before the Sen. 
Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, 112th 
Cong. (2012) (statement of Mental Health Alternatives to Solitary Confinement), 
http://solitarywatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/mental-health-alternatives-to-
solitary-confinement.pdf [https://perma.cc/36PT-5BXN]. 
 112. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 137(6)(d)(1).  Although most of these units serve 
exclusively people with S-designations, some serve individuals with a service level of 
one or two.  To be sure, those individuals have been diagnosed with serious mental 
illness despite the fact that OMH has not afforded them an S-designation. 
 113. What is often colloquially referred to as “solitary confinement” is referred to 
in New York State Law as “segregated confinement,” or “the disciplinary 
confinement of an inmate in a special housing unit or in a separate keeplock housing 
unit.  Special housing units and separate keeplock units are housing units that consist 
of cells grouped so as to provide separation from the general population, and may be 
used to house inmates confined pursuant to the disciplinary procedures described in 
regulations.” N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 2(23). 
 114. The Intermediate Care Program (“ICP”) operates on a “step system.”  Each 
step, of which there are four, promotes increased proficiency at activities of daily 
living and provides for increased privileges, such as increased access to work or 
education assignments, additional program offerings, structured work programs, 
increased property privileges, and increased access to other parts of the facility.  
Individuals incarcerated in the ICP are provided with programming pursuant to an 
individualized treatment plan developed by ICP staff.  Each ICP is also expected to 
develop its own program incentives, designed to secure rule compliance, support 
positive behaviors, improve treatment compliance, improve program success, and 
ultimately [allow] for integration into a less restrictive environment. N.Y. STATE 
DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS. & N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, INTERMEDIATE 
CARE PROGRAM MANUAL 3–40 (2009) [hereinafter INTERMEDIATE CARE PROGRAM 
MANUAL]. See generally DOCCS Directive # 4302, supra note 107.  DOCCS and 
OMH suggest several program incentives, including basic items such as extra 
personal hygiene products, snack prizes, an additional shower, headphones, and 
access to movies.  Although advocates receive many complaints about conditions in 
the ICPs, many of their clients have successfully transitioned from an ICP to general 
population and reported improvement in their ability to cope with the prison 
environment and manage the manifestation of their mental health needs.  ICPs 
operate at several maximum-security prisons, including Attica, Auburn, Bedford 
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Program, Enhanced Intermediate Care Program, and Discharge 
Intermediate Care Program.115  All of those units serve individuals 
with S-designations or those designated service level one.116  
Individuals in those units are provided with four hours of structured, 
out-of-cell programming five days per week.117  That programming is 
designed to promote their eventual release into the general 
population setting.118  The Transitional Intermediate Care Program 
provides two groups per week with programming aimed at assisting 
individuals who have been in an Intermediate Care Program to 
remain successfully in general population, hence the “transitional” 
moniker.119  The Enhanced Intermediate Care Program and 
Discharge Intermediate Care Program serve people with histories of 
violence who are within 18–48 months of their approved release date 
and 9–12 months of their approved release date, respectively.120  
Those units provide substantially the same programming as the 
regular Intermediate Care Program.121  As a result of litigation, some 
Intermediate Care Programs, which were once located exclusively at 
maximum-security prisons, are now located at medium security 
facilities.122 
                                                                                                                 
Hills, Clinton, Elmira, Five Points, Great Meadow, Green Haven, Mid-State, Sing 
Sing, and Sullivan Correctional Facilities. DOCCS Directive # 4302, supra note 107, 
at 5; see also Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 9.40: 
Intermediate Care Program Referral 1 (December 5, 2013) (on file with author); 
supra INTERMEDIATE CARE PROGRAM MANUAL, at 3 (“The goal of the ICP is to 
improve inmate-patients’ functioning while reducing the impact that symptoms of 
mental illness and behavioral instability can have on adjustment during incarceration.  
The ICP is a therapeutic community that provides mental health services and 
promotes development of self-regulation, symptom management, social, recreational, 
and habilitative skills.  In addition to traditional clinic services, the ICP provides case 
management, crisis intervention, adaptive skills training, self-help, and peer 
support.”). 
 115. DOCCS Directive # 4302, supra note 107, at 4–6. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 8. 
 118. Id. at 4. 
 119. Id. at 5. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. at 5.  Before the private settlement agreement in Disability Advocates, Inc. 
v. New York State Office of Mental Health required expanded treatment options for 
individuals incarcerated in general population and solitary confinement, DOCCS had 
already established ICPs in certain maximum-security state prisons.  In response to 
Disability Advocates, Inc. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, which 
challenged DOCCS’s and OMH’s placement of the ICPs at only maximum-security 
prisons, DOCCS and OMH opened ICPs at Albion Correctional Facility and Fishkill 
Correctional Facility, both of which are medium-security prisons. Private Settlement 
Agreement, supra note 25, at 7–11 (“Defendants will add ninety (90) new beds in the 
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The second type of RMHTU serves people with certain solitary 
confinement sanctions.123  As a result of Disability Advocates Inc. v. 
NYS Office of Mental Health,124 DOCCS and OMH created new 
units to serve individuals with S-designations who receive a solitary 
confinement sanction of thirty days or more.125  Those individuals are 
diverted from solitary confinement to a Behavioral Health Unit,126 a 
Residential Mental Health Unit,127 an Intensive Intermediate Care 
Program, or a Therapeutic Behavioral Unit128 to serve their 
segregated confinement sanction.  Individuals in the Behavioral 
Health Unit are afforded two hours per day of structured, out-of-cell 
therapeutic programming five days per week, whereas individuals in 
                                                                                                                 
Intermediate Care Program . . . in addition to the 572 current . . . beds and the 118 
additional . . . beds covered by the previously approved 2004 and 2005 initiatives.”); 
see also DOCCS Directive # 4302, supra note 107, at 5. 
 123. See supra text accompanying note 122. 
 124. See generally Private Settlement Agreement, supra note 25. 
 125. Id. at 8. 
 126. The Behavioral Health Unit affords incarcerated individuals two hours per 
day out-of-cell therapeutic programming and is located at Great Meadow 
Correctional Facility.  The Behavioral Health Unit operates similarly to the 
Intermediate Care Program in that incentives are afforded and advancement is 
obtained through program compliance, attendance, and positive behavior. N.Y. 
DEP’T OF CORR. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, BEHAVIORAL HEALTH UNIT ORIENTATION 
HANDBOOK 2–5 (2015) (on file with author) (“The Behavioral Health Unit . . . is a 
therapeutic program designed to teach you the skills necessary to solve problems and 
cope with stress in a healthy, nonviolent way.  By acquiring and practicing these 
skills, you may reduce or eliminate the behaviors that lead to Misbehavior Reports.  
This will help you re-enter general population of a DOCCS facility, another special 
program, or the community.  This is accomplished through Mental Health and 
DOCCS treatment/programming that allows for interaction within groups, and 
individual counseling.”). 
 127. If a participant successfully graduates to stage two in a Residential Mental 
Health Unit, they are offered “at least four hours a day structured out-of-cell 
therapeutic programming and/or mental health treatment . . . and . . . additional out 
of cell activities consistent with mental health needs.” DOCCS Directive # 4302, 
supra note 107, at 8.  Residential Mental Health Units are located at Attica 
Correctional Facility, Five Points Correctional Facility, and Marcy Correctional 
Facility. Id. 
 128. The Therapeutic Behavioral Unit, which is the Residential Mental Health 
Unit for women, is located at Bedford Hills Correctional Facility.  Not only do 
individuals in these units receive therapeutic treatment, but they can work their way 
toward receiving property, services and privileges similar to those available in general 
population.  They are assessed on essentially the same scale that is used in the 
Behavioral Health Unit, but the program is divided up into three stages with 
attendant “milestones.”  Each milestone is associated with additional privileges, with 
the third being associated with discharge to an alternate program. N.Y. DEP’T OF 
CORR. & CMTY. SUPERVISION & N.Y. OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, ATTICA 
RESIDENTIAL MENTAL HEALTH UNIT INMATE-PATIENT ORIENTATION HANDBOOK 5–
10 (Nov. 2016) (on file with author). 
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the other three aforementioned units are afforded four hours of such 
programming per day.129  The existence of these units, and criteria for 
when DOCCS must divert or remove individuals to them, are now 
codified in the SHU Exclusion Law.130 
In circumstances satisfying certain codified requirements, DOCCS 
and OMH are entitled to retain individuals with S-designations in 
solitary confinement for over thirty days.131  First, DOCCS and OMH 
must demonstrate that “exceptional circumstances” justify placing the 
individual in a more restrictive environment.132  Where DOCCS and 
OMH have satisfied that requirement, they must provide a 
heightened level of care to those individuals.133  DOCCS and OMH 
often provide such care in the Group Therapy Program, in which they 
offer individuals two hours of structured, out-of-cell programming 
five days per week in the Special Housing Unit itself.134 
As of December 31, 2015, 1205 individuals diagnosed with serious 
mental health needs were housed in an RMHTU.135  Of those 
individuals, 987 were in a general population RMHTU, such as an 
Intermediate Care Program.136  That number represented 39.2% of 
the total DOCCS population diagnosed with serious mental health 
needs.137  Of those diagnosed with a serious mental health need, 210 
individuals were confined to an RMHTU for people with solitary 
confinement sanctions of over thirty days, such as the Residential 
Mental Health Unit.138  That number represented 8% of the total 
DOCCS population diagnosed with serious mental health needs.139  
These figures need some qualification, however.  Prisoner rights 
advocates receive frequent complaints from incarcerated persons, 
                                                                                                                 
 129. DOCCS Directive # 4302, supra note 107, at 4. 
 130. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 137.6(d)(i) (McKinney 2017) (requiring DOCCS 
to divert or remove individuals with serious mental illness from segregated 
confinement where the period of such confinement could be longer than thirty days). 
 131. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 2.21, 137.6(d)(ii)(E) (McKinney 2017). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. DOCCS Directive # 4302, supra note 107, at 5. 
 135. CENT. N.Y. PSYCHIATRIC CTR., N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, 
2015 ANNUAL CORRECTIONS-BASED OPERATIONS STATISTICAL REPORT 3 (2015) (on 
file with author). 
 136. Id. at 7–9. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 7–9, 15. 
 139. Id. 
2018] GRASSROOTS CHALLENGES 461 
alleging that they have been erroneously classified or misdiagnosed, 
sometimes in retaliation for alleged misbehavior.140 
1. Regional Catchment Areas 
The DOCCS system is divided into “Regional Catchment Areas,” 
or “hubs,” which facilitate the transfer from one facility to another of 
individuals who require mental health services, evaluations, or 
treatment.141  There are fourteen main mental health hubs, which 
generally have mental health offices, private interview rooms, and 
observation cells for people who are experiencing a crisis.142  
DOCCS’s crisis observation unit is called the Residential Crisis 
Treatment Program.143  People may be admitted to the Residential 
Crisis Treatment Program if they trigger a suicide screen upon 
admission to segregated confinement,144 if they manifest behavior 
                                                                                                                 
 140. See Mental Health Services in NY Prisons, Hearing Before the Assemb. 
Comms. Corr. & Mental Health 4 (2014) (statement of Jack Beck, Dir., Prison 
Visiting Project, Corr. Ass’n of N.Y.) (“Related to patients in [solitary confinement], 
there has been a major shift in diagnoses in the last six years from schizophrenia and 
psychoses (35% drop) to adjustment, anxiety, and personality disorders (72% rise).  
With a related 36% drop in the number of S-designations, less people are eligible for 
[diversion from solitary confinement], raising serious concerns about whether the 
SHU Exclusion Law’s provision of a sharp line above which people receive intensive 
services and below which people remain in [solitary confinement], are leading to 
improper diagnoses.  These concerns are even more stark given that the percentage 
of the total OMH caseload designated as Level 1 has risen in recent years.”). 
 141. DOCCS Directive # 4301, supra note 33, at 1–3. 
 142. See id. 
 143. Id. at 3. 
 144. Id. at 4–7.  Although the Residential Crisis Treatment Program and the “hub” 
structure predate Disability Advocates, Inc. v. New York State Office of Mental 
Health and the subsequent codification of the SHU Exclusion Law, that law 
established the requirement that DOCCS or an OMH clinician must perform a 
suicide screening on all individuals upon their admission into solitary confinement 
and a full mental health assessment within one day of the imposition of a solitary 
confinement sanction.  If a suicide risk is identified, an OMH clinician must be 
consulted and precautions must be taken to mitigate the potential for suicide.  These 
requirements were initially imposed by settlement in Disability Advocates, Inc. v. 
New York State Office of Mental Health. See Private Settlement Agreement, supra 
note 25, at 14.  It is now codified. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 137.6(d)(ii)(A)–(B) 
(McKinney 2017).  If the incarcerated individual is placed in solitary confinement at a 
service level 1 or service level 2 facility, they must be fully assessed for the presence 
of serious mental illness within one business day of their placement. Id.  If they are 
placed in solitary confinement at a service level 3 or service level 4 facility, they must 
be assessed for the presence of serious mental illness within fourteen days of their 
placement. Id. 
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that triggers a mental health referral,145 or if they report suicidal 
ideation or thoughts of self-harm.146 
As a precaution, individuals who are admitted to the Residential 
Crisis Treatment Program are afforded constant clinical supervision 
for stabilization.147  Residential Crisis Treatment Programs consist of 
both individual cells and dorm beds.148  Upon transfer to a 
Residential Crisis Treatment Program cell, individuals are provided 
with “amenities” commensurate with their suicide risk level as 
assessed by OMH, including one specialized tear and fire resistant 
mattress, two specialized tear resistant mats, one specialized tear 
resistant safety smock, one pair of rubber sandals, and certain hygiene 
products and eating utensils (which they are not allowed to keep in 
their cells and must return after use).149  They are often unable to 
receive mail or otherwise communicate with the outside world.150  
OMH gives clinicians increased access to their patients in order to 
extensively document the individuals’ status during their stay in the 
Residential Crisis Treatment Program.151  In the event of a stay 
longer than seven calendar days, additional approval by a clinical 
director is required or a transfer to CNYPC is initiated.152  Individuals 
in the Residential Crisis Treatment Program are to be transferred out 
only where one of several criteria are met, as determined and 
documented by a psychiatrist.153  DOCCS and OMH have developed 
                                                                                                                 
 145. See N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, Directive # 4101: Inmate 
Suicide Prevention 2, 3 (Jan. 1, 2016) (on file with author). 
 146. See id at 15. 
 147. Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 4.0: RCTP 
Observation Cells & Dormitory Beds 1 (June 1, 2016) [hereinafter CBO Policy # 4.0] 
(on file with author) (“Observation cells should be utilized only for inmate-patients 
who may be psychiatrically unstable, unpredictable and/or a danger to themselves or 
others.”). 
 148. Id. 
 149. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, Directive # 4308: Residential Crisis 
Treatment Program (RCTP) 4, 5 (Jan. 2, 2018) (on file with author); see also CBO 
Policy # 4.0, supra note 147, at 3. 
 150. See generally CBO Policy # 4.0, supra note 147. 
 151. Id. at 4–7. 
 152. Id. at 7. 
 153. Id. (“Transfers out of an RCTP Observation Cell/Dormitory Bed can occur 
when the crisis precipitating the transfer to RCTP has been resolved, the psychiatric 
assessment suggests the patient is capable of meaningfully participating in 
programming and that return to a lower level of care represents the least restrictive 
and appropriate means of treatment, the psychiatrist assessment determines the need 
for an increased level of treatment, e.g. transfer to CNYPC, the need for an 
observation cell level of care is no longer met, and a step-down to a Dormitory Bed is 
warranted.”). 
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these policies as a safeguard against tragic, avoidable suicides and 
incidents of self-harm. 
2. VTC in New York Prisons: Implementation, Current Practices, 
and Shortcomings 
Though DOCCS and OMH have created a reasonable 
infrastructure for the delivery of mental health treatment in New 
York State prisons, that infrastructure is undermined by resource 
deficiencies caused by the geographic siting of New York’s prisons.  
One manifestation of those resource issues is DOCCS’s and OMH’s 
use of VTC. 
As early as the late 1990s, it was clear to much of the practicing 
psychiatric community that VTC, and telemedicine more broadly, 
could help close the prison resource gap.154  Although it was unclear 
when or whether VTC could or would replace in-person psychiatric 
evaluations,155 practicing psychologists wrote positively about the 
then-existing jail and prison VTC programs.156  That said, 
psychiatrists have also been vocal about the potential for negative 
effects of such technology and the need to control for those negative 
effects, in particular stressing the importance of clear and robust 
policies and procedures for the implementation and use of the 
technology.157 
                                                                                                                 
 154. Nat’l Comm’n on Corr. Health Care, Position Statement: Use of Telemedicine 
Technology in Correctional Facilities, 6 J. CORR. HEALTH CARE 129, 134 (1999) 
[hereinafter Position Statement] (“The use of telemedicine affords correctional 
facilities many opportunities for reducing operational costs associated with providing 
health care to confined individuals.”). 
 155. See Steven E. Hyler et al., Can Telepsychiatry Replace In-Person Psychiatric 
Assessments? A Review and Meta-Analysis of Comparison Studies, 10 CNS 
SPECTRUMS 403, 411–12 (2005) (“Telepsychiatry seems to be a reasonable alternative 
in situations in which it is difficult or impractical to arrange for I-P assessments . . . .  
Telepsychiatry could be viewed as a necessity in situations in which the alternative 
might be that no psychiatrist or psychiatrist sub-specialist would be available . . . .  
Whether telepsychiatry can replace [in-person] for ongoing therapy requires more 
study.”). 
 156. See, e.g., Even Lynn Nelson et al., A Comparison of Psychiatrist Evaluation 
and Patient Symptom Report in a Jail Telepsychiatry Clinic, 10 TELEMEDICINE J. & 
E-HEALTH S-54, S-54 (2004) (touting the quality of prison VTC programs and 
prospects for expansion). 
 157. Position Statement, supra note 154, at 134–35 (“Policies and procedures must 
clearly define the purpose and instances in which telemedicine may be used in a 
correctional facility.  Regardless of the type and combination of technologies used to 
provide medical care, the basic principals [sic] governing the physician/patient 
relationship must remain intact.  This responsibility can be met in large part by 
ensuring that telemedicine policies and procedures comply with the National 
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Since VTC’s implementation, both DOCCS and OMH have relied 
heavily on its use for the provision of psychiatric treatment.  The 
reliance on VTC is an outgrowth of the challenges of staffing mental 
health satellite units that are located in rural parts of New York.158  It 
is a natural response to resource issues and one method by which the 
State can avoid liability for failure to provide specialty care or crisis 
intervention services.159  Unfortunately, VTC’s use is not governed by 
robust DOCCS and OMH policy.160  It is therefore unclear how 
DOCCS or OMH control for the potential drawbacks of VTC or 
whether the agencies evaluated the potential negative consequences 
of its use before promulgating VTC policies.161 
Although DOCCS and OMH have promulgated policies 
concerning the use of VTC in state prisons, those policies are not 
particularly detailed.162  Pursuant to CNYPC policy, OMH maintains 
a VTC coordinator at each facility that hosts a satellite unit.163  
Before any VTC appointment, CNYPC staff at the facility where the 
incarcerated patient is located must send copies of certain medical 
documentation to the VTC unit.164  The same is true of any follow-up 
VTC appointment.165  To ensure that the VTC Unit has sufficient 
time to review pertinent documents, all documents must be sent at 
                                                                                                                 
Commission on Correctional Health Care’s Standards for Health Services that have 
been developed for prisons, jails, and juvenile detention and confinement facilities.”). 
 158. See Letter from Donna Hall, Ph.D, Assoc. Comm’r, Div. of Forensic Servs., 
N.Y. Office of Mental Health, to Melissa Finn, MSW, Facility Review Specialist II, 
N.Y. Justice Ctr. for the Protection of People with Special Needs (Mar. 22, 2016) (on 
file with author). 
 159. See generally Position Statement, supra note 154. 
 160. CNYPC Corrections-Based Operations policies and DOCCS Directives cited 
herein represent all DOCCS and OMH policies on the provision of VTC, specifically.  
The author confirmed this by Freedom of Information Law requests to DOCCS and 
OMH. Letter from Riele J. Morgiewicz, Records Access Officer, N.Y. State Office of 
Mental Health, to author (Oct. 26, 2017) (on file with author); Letter from David J. 
Harvey, Assistant Counsel, N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, to author (Oct. 
27, 2017) (on file with author). 
 161. See generally supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 162. See CBO Policy # 2.9, supra note 42, at 1; Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., 
Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 3.11: Telepsychiatry Orders 1 (Mar. 16, 2016) 
[hereinafter CBO Policy # 3.11] (on file with author). 
 163. CBO Policy # 2.9, supra note 42, at 1. 
 164. Id. (Documentation includes the chronological record, diagnosis record, core 
history, Comprehensive Suicide Risk Assessment (CSRA), screening/admission note, 
initial psychiatric evaluation, last three psychiatric progress notes, last three primary 
progress notes, termination/transfer progress note, last physician’s order, most recent 
medication treatment record and pharmacy print out, and most recent laboratory 
results (if applicable).). 
 165. Id. 
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least twenty-four hours prior to the appointment.166  Upon the 
completion of the appointment, the VTC psychiatrist is required to 
fax new medical documentation to the facility where the incarcerated 
patient is located.167  CNYPC staff at that facility are then required to 
discuss the treatment plan with the incarcerated patient following the 
VTC session “when needed.”168  Policies provide no guidance 
regarding the determination of “need.”169  DOCCS and OMH have 
also promulgated a policy concerning medication orders following a 
VTC session.170  That policy largely concerns documentation 
requirements.171  No DOCCS or OMH policy addresses staffing, 
quantity, or quality of VTC services afforded to incarcerated 
individuals.172 
While VTC may appear a convenient and efficient option to close 
the resource gap, it comes with many drawbacks.  Perhaps the biggest 
of those drawbacks is VTC’s potential to undermine trust, rapport, 
and communication between physicians and patients.173  With respect 
to communication, practitioners posit that VTC may undermine a 
physician’s ability to assess non-verbal communication, and that 
patients may be unable to adapt their communication style to suit the 
medium.174  Whereas non-verbal communications are often 
interpreted naturally during in-person interactions, VTC interactions 
do not foster the same natural understanding of non-verbal cues.175  
Assessing non-verbal communication is an important aspect of any 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Id. at 2. 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Id.  For more on the importance of discussing treatment plans with patients, 
see generally F.J. Fowler, Informing and Involving Patients to Improve the Quality of 
Medical Decisions, 30 HEALTH AFFAIRS 699 (2011) (discussing best practices for 
involving patients in treatment decisions and treatment planning). 
 170. CBO Policy # 3.11, supra note 162, at 1–2. 
 171. See id. 
 172. These are areas any correctional VTC policy should address, as contemplated 
by the National Commission Standards. See Position Statement, supra note 154, at 
135. 
 173. Melissa Lee et al., The Doctor Is Online: An Introduction to Text-Based 
Telepsychiatry, 8 UNIV. B.C. MED. J. 33, 33 (2017) (stating that “[s]ome clinicians are 
concerned that the absence of face-to-face interaction and non-verbal cues could 
undermine communication during therapy” and reasoning that those losses are only 
“partially” offset where clinicians take remedial measures). 
 174. Jay H. Shore et al., Cultural Aspects of Telepsychiatry, 12 J. TELEMEDICINE & 
TELECARE 116, 117 (2006). 
 175. Hilty et al., supra note 47, at 18. 
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reliable psychiatric assessment, particularly where a clinician is 
assessing the presence of potential suicidality or suicidal ideation.176 
Some practitioners posit that it is much more difficult for a patient 
to establish a connection with a medical professional over VTC.177  
Patients may feel disconnected because of the medium itself, 
regardless of the qualifications of the physician or the degree of 
attention paid to dignifying the patient and fully assessing the 
patient’s needs.178  The implications of a lack of trust are particularly 
acute where a physician is assessing a patient for suicidality.179  
Patients are far less likely to tell the truth about their feelings where a 
robust therapeutic relationship has not been established.180 
Another danger of VTC is its potential to endanger the 
effectiveness of diagnoses and treatment.  Scholars repeatedly 
reported during the late 1990s and early to mid-2000s that deficiencies 
in technology undermined the efficacy of VTC and patients’ 
confidence in the medium.181  As recently as 2004, some psychiatrists 
tempered their positive review of VTC’s potential with concerns 
about its prospective effectiveness in a carceral setting.182  Three 
years earlier, several scholars published a study that indicated that 
reliability results were consistently lower for VTC evaluations that 
required visual observation rather than a simple self-report.183  As a 
precaution, some scholars have advocated that VTC practitioners 
                                                                                                                 
 176. Khushminder Chahal, The Utility of Assessing Nonverbal Communication in 
the Psychiatric Evaluation, 12 AM. J. PSYCH. RESIDENTS 3, 3 (2017); Gretchen N. 
Foley & Julie P. Gentile, Nonverbal Communication in Psychotherapy, 
7 PSYCHIATRY 38, 44 (2010).  In the author’s experience interviewing incarcerated 
individuals with mental health needs and intellectual disabilities, a twitch of the leg, a 
forlorn countenance or a rapid eye movement may indicate an otherwise non-obvious 
disposition. 
 177. Lee et al., supra note 173, at 33. 
 178. Hilty et al., supra note 47, at 16 (“One concern with telemedicine is that the 
technology may adversely affect . . . the development of a therapeutic alliance.”). 
 179. See Linda Ganzini et al., Trust Is the Basis for Effective Suicide Risk 
Screening and Assessment in Veterans, 28 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1215, 1215 (2013). 
 180. Jessica Sun Choi, Mental Health Services via Skype: Meeting the Mental 
Health Needs of Community College Students Through Telemedicine, 25 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 331, 344 (2016). 
 181. See Christopher J. Caryl, Malpractice and Other Issues Preventing the 
Development of Telemedicine, 12 J. L. & HEALTH 173, 201 (1998); Choi, supra note 
180, at 351; Barbara M. Rohland et al., Acceptability of Telepsychiatry to a Rural 
Population, 51 PSYCH. SERVS. 672, 673 (2000); Shore et al., supra note 174, at 119; 
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HEALTH L. 61, 62–63 (1996). 
 182. Nelson et al., supra note 156, at S-84. 
 183. Monnier et al., supra note 47, at 606. 
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forego diagnosis where they believe that, due to the medium, they 
have insufficient data.184 
Finally, a third danger is VTC’s potential to undermine patient 
privacy.  However, this concern may be alleviated as technology 
improves.  Though today’s technology is by no means beyond issues 
of hacking and privacy protection, it is nonetheless better suited to 
ensure the confidentiality of digital medical records.185  Many 
agencies—though neither DOCCS nor OMH—have moved to an 
entirely digital storage model for medical and mental health 
records.186 
As of 2015, twenty percent of Americans lived in an area that has a 
shortage of primary care physicians.187  That percentage was expected 
to increase.188  This year, every prison with a mental health satellite 
unit was found to be located in a city, town, or village with a shortage 
of mental health professionals.189  Therefore, it would be 
disingenuous to suggest that VTC should not be used in prisons to 
close the resources gap, particularly as that gap widens.  It is not 
disingenuous, however, to suggest that DOCCS and OMH should 
control for concerns about the use of VTC by developing more robust 
policies concerning issues such as effectiveness of communication 
over VTC and confidentiality of VTC communications.  That 
suggestion is bolstered by the findings of oversight agencies such as 
the New York Justice Center for the Protection of People with 
Special Needs (“Justice Center”), Disability Rights New York, and 
Mental Health Alternatives to Solitary Confinement, some of which 
crystallize the above concerns.190 
                                                                                                                 
 184. Caryl, supra note 181, at 201. 
 185. Laurinda B. Harman et al., Electronic Health Records: Privacy, 
Confidentiality, and Security, 14 AMA J. ETHICS 712, 712 (2012). 
 186. Darrelle Knight, Electronic Medical Records: Moving Jails Forward, 
CORRECTIONS (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.corrections.com/news/article/22296-
electronic-medical-records-moving-jails-forward [https://perma.cc/KV9D-V5QF]. 
 187. Avery Schumacher, Telehealth: Current Barriers, Potential Progress, 76 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 409, 413 (2015). 
 188. Id. 
 189. UNIV. OF THE STATE OF N.Y., supra note 38. 
 190. See Letter from Melissa Finn, MSW, Review Specialist II, N.Y. Justice Ctr. 
for the Protection of People with Special Needs, to Donna Hall, Ph.D, Assoc. 
Comm’r, Div. of Forensic Servs., N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, and Anthony J. 
Annucci, Acting Comm’r, N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision (March 3, 
2016) (on file with author); Letter from Deborah McCulloch, Exec. Dir., Cent. N.Y. 
Psychiatric Ctr., to Elena Landriscina, Staff Attorney, Disability Rights N.Y. (Dec. 
12, 2016) (on file with author); Minutes, Meeting Between the N.Y. Justice Ctr. for 
the Protection of People with Special Needs and Mental Health Alternatives to 
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Over the last two years, the Justice Center191 has issued findings to 
both DOCCS and OMH regarding psychiatric staffing in several state 
prisons and has informed advocates that staffing problems are related 
in part to the relative isolation of state prisons.  For example, the 
Justice Center issued a findings letter to DOCCS and OMH on March 
3, 2016 concerning its investigation of a suicide at Attica Correctional 
Facility.192  The Justice Center found in relevant part that due to 
staffing shortages, the deceased individual had only one opportunity 
over a thirty-day period to meet with a psychiatrist prior to his death, 
and did not receive the psychiatric evaluation he was supposed to 
have been afforded within one day of his admission to the Residential 
Crisis Treatment Program.193  DOCCS and OMH afforded the 
individual only one psychiatric evaluation, which was facilitated via 
VTC and occurred immediately before his discharge from the 
Residential Crisis Treatment Program.194  During that VTC 
evaluation, a psychiatrist cleared the individual’s discharge from 
Residential Crisis Treatment Program so that he could call his wife.195  
The Justice Center found “no documentation to support that [the 
                                                                                                                 
Solitary Confinement (Jan. 20, 2017) [hereinafter 2017 Meeting Minutes] (on file with 
author). 
 191. The Justice Center is responsible for monitoring the quality of mental health 
care provided to incarcerated individuals pursuant to the SHU Exclusion Law. N.Y. 
CORRECT. LAW § 401-a (McKinney 2017).  In exercising that responsibility, the 
Justice Center conducts monitoring in segregated confinement units throughout the 
state to ensure that all SHU Exclusion Law benchmarks are being met. Id.  The 
Justice Center ensures that SHU mental health screenings and assessments are being 
conducted in a timely fashion and that DOCCS and OMH meet the other SHU 
Exclusion Law benchmarks such as the mandate to “[divert and remove] inmates 
with serious mental illness from segregated confinement to residential mental health 
treatment units.” Id.  The Justice Center also assesses the general population mental 
health units, and the quality of care afforded to incarcerated individuals in all 
Residential Mental Health Treatment Units. Id.  The Justice Center occasionally 
takes on an advocacy posture, recommending that certain incarcerated individuals be 
placed into an Residential Mental Health Treatment Unit or be afforded additional 
attention. Id.  The Justice Center has been an integral watchdog to ensure that 
mental health services are expanded upon and reinforced for individuals incarcerated 
throughout the state. See id.; 2017 Meeting Minutes, supra note 190; see also Forensic 
Oversight Unit, N.Y. JUSTICE CTR. FOR THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL 
NEEDS, https://www.justicecenter.ny.gov/oversight-and-monitoring/forensic-oversight 
[https://perma.cc/86UA-FJDJ]. 
 192. See Letter from Melissa Finn, supra note 190.  Due to heavy redactions in the 
Justice Center’s letter and both DOCCS’s and OMH’s response, it is impossible to 
ascertain how long the individual was in the Residential Crisis Treatment Program, 
how many appointments he should have had, and whether he was otherwise cared for 
in accordance with applicable policy and law. See id. 
 193. Id. at 3. 
 194. Id. at 1. 
 195. Id. at 3. 
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individual] . . . received any mental health assistance between his 
discharge from the [Residential Crisis Treatment Program], and when 
he died by suicide on [redacted].”196 
These findings raise serious questions about the quality of care 
provided.  Were warning signs present but missed due to the quality 
of the VTC medium?  Would the individual have engaged more 
readily with the psychiatrist if the evaluation had been conducted in 
person?  And if so, would he have received more careful attention?  
Would the psychiatrist have approved the individual’s discharge after 
an in-person evaluation?  These questions cannot be answered, but 
these are valid inquiries given the above-cited literature.197 
The Justice Center raised the issue of psychiatric staffing very 
directly in its findings by referencing a previous finding it issued to 
DOCCS and OMH regarding “the lack of psychiatrists in the Attica 
[Correctional Facility].”198  The Justice Center stated that both 
agencies had acknowledged the problem, reporting that Attica 
Correctional Facility added an additional VTC Unit to “enhance the 
number of hours for assessments via VTC, and recruitment strategies 
were continuing.”199  Despite these measures, the Justice Center 
found that the deceased man had not received care consistent with 
the applicable OMH policy.200  The Justice Center also found that the 
individual was not afforded a step-down from the Residential Crisis 
Treatment Program,201 contrary to best practices.202  In consideration 
of those findings, the Justice Center requested an update from the 
respective agencies on the “current status of an on-site psychiatrist at 
the Attica Correctional Facility, and the current number of available 
hours per week of VTC assessments.”203  In response, the Associate 
Commissioner of OMH stated that the agency “continues to actively 
                                                                                                                 
 196. Id. 
 197. See sources cited supra notes 173–86. 
 198. See Letter from Melissa Finn, supra note 190. 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 4.  Individuals who are afforded a “step down” from Residential Crisis 
Treatment Program are not immediately discharged upon a finding that they are no 
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their cell. CBO Policy # 4.0, supra note 147, at 7–8. 
 202. Letter from Melissa Finn, supra note 190, at 4. 
 203. Id. 
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recruit for an on-site psychiatrist at Attica Correctional Facility.  The 
current number of available hours per week for VTC assessments is 
60–68 hours.  An additional VTC unit was added, along with 
continued recruitment strategies to date, as indicated in the August 
correspondence.”204  OMH still relies heavily on VTC for the 
provision of such services at Attica.205  Unfortunately, neither the 
Justice Center nor OMH extended their findings to the quality of 
VTC itself or to its impact upon the relevant suicide. 
The Justice Center has continually reiterated similar staffing 
concerns to Mental Health Alternatives to Solitary Confinement.  In 
June 2013, the Justice Center reported to Mental Health Alternatives 
to Solitary Confinement that certain Intermediate Care Programs 
were experiencing staffing shortages, and that others—including 
Fishkill and Green Haven, both Intermediate Care Programs located 
closer to New York City—were considered “model [Intermediate 
Care Programs]” for staffing, documentation, and programming.206  
During that meeting the Justice Center emphasized that the drop in 
admissions to the Intermediate Care Program likely had to do with 
staffing issues.207  The Justice Center subsequently reported to Mental 
Health Alternatives to Solitary Confinement a serious shortage of 
psychiatrists, doctors, and providers in the prisons, and posited that 
the vacancies exist due to the location of the facilities.208  Although 
the Justice Center informed Mental Health Alternatives to Solitary 
Confinement that it has not “focused on” the shortages issue, it 
reported that it encouraged OMH to be “more creative in 
recruitment and retention” initiatives.209  Similarly, the Justice Center 
reported to Mental Health Alternatives to Solitary Confinement that 
appointments are often missed because staff is not available.210  
Attica Correctional Facility was used as an example, where there was 
one psychiatrist on site and four days of VTC despite the large size of 
Attica’s mental health case load.211 
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In late 2016, OMH shared similar findings with Disability Rights 
New York, New York State’s Protection and Advocacy System for 
individuals with disabilities.  Disability Rights New York has the 
federal statutory responsibility to protect and advocate for individuals 
with disabilities,212 and has devoted a significant amount of its 
resources to advocacy for individuals with mental health needs 
incarcerated in New York State prisons.213  Disability Rights New 
York was informed via letter that “[g]iven the limited psychiatric 
resources at Elmira [Correctional Facility], cases are clinically 
prioritized with the VTC psychiatrists in an effort to effectively serve 
all of the inmate-patients receiving mental health treatment in that 
unit.”214  In this case, Disability Rights New York was concerned with 
OMH’s failure to afford an incarcerated individual with a psychiatric 
assessment upon his transfer to the Residential Crisis Treatment 
Program, in accordance with the applicable policy.215  That individual 
was not seen by a psychiatrist for an evaluation until long after his 
transfer to the Residential Crisis Treatment Program, and was seen 
by VTC rather than in person.216  OMH excused its failure to provide 
a prompt assessment as a “clinical oversight,” and closed by reporting 
its “continue[d] efforts to recruit and retain psychiatric staff, and to 
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 214. Letter from Deborah McCulloch, supra note 190, at 1. 
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maximize the resources currently available at Corrections Based 
Operations.”217 
If VTC is properly viewed as a second-best measure, there should 
be a commitment towards identifying the ways to bring services in 
line with people’s needs.  This necessarily means analyzing whether 
incarcerated people are better served by remaining closer to the 
communities they come from, and what commitment New York must 
make to investing more resources in those communities.218  The most 
salient questions for movement lawyers to ask are: what resources can 
we bring to bear to force that conversation upon DOCCS and OMH?  
Can litigation force DOCCS to correct VTC so that it can continue to 
be used as a means to address the broader resources problems, or are 
other approaches more promising?  And even if movement lawyers 
correct deficiencies in DOCCS and OMH’s VTC program, what does 
that do to address the broader geographical problems that prompted 
the agencies to use VTC in the first place? 
II.  THE INSUFFICIENCY OF LITIGATION SOLUTIONS ABSENT 
GRASSROOTS APPROACHES 
Movement lawyers have long used Eighth Amendment impact 
litigation as a tool to expand and improve medical and mental health 
services in prisons.219  It is unclear, however, whether such litigation is 
the best tool to address deficiencies in VTC as a medium, or the 
geographic and resources problems that caused the expansion of VTC 
in prisons.  Part II provides a brief overview of some of two potential 
avenues for improving VTC through Eighth Amendment litigation.220  
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It ultimately concludes that litigation is not the answer, but only part 
of a larger grassroots strategy to reverse the sprawl of the prison 
system and bring resources closer to home.  Litigation has a role to 
play, but it will not create sustainable change without a coexisting 
grassroots movement. 
A. An Abridged Overview of the Eighth Amendment Framework 
The Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment221 forbids the denial of treatment for serious medical 
needs222 of prisoners, including serious mental health needs.223  A 
prima facie case for the denial of mental health treatment in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment requires a plaintiff to meet a two-pronged 
test.224  First, the plaintiff must establish that they have a serious 
mental health need.225  The first prong is considered the “objective 
prong.”226  As such, the defendant must prove the existence of their 
serious mental health need through evidence of prior diagnosis and 
treatment or the obviousness of the need for treatment.227  Not every 
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 224. Conn v. City of Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1094–102 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted 
on other grounds and case remanded, 563 U.S. 915 (2011), opinion reinstated on 
remand, 658 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 225. Conn, 591 F.3d at 1095. 
 226. Id. 
 227. See, e.g., Johnson v. Busbee, 953 F.2d 349, 351 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that a 
serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring 
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mental health need is considered serious.228  The Second Circuit 
considers several questions in determining whether a need is serious, 
including “whether a reasonable doctor or patient would perceive the 
need in question as important and worthy of comment or treatment, 
whether the medical condition significantly affects daily activities, and 
the existence of chronic and substantial pain.”229 
The Supreme Court added the second prong, the deliberate 
indifference standard, in Farmer v. Brennan.230  To meet the second 
prong, the plaintiff must establish that the defendants were 
deliberately indifferent to that need because they knew of, and 
disregarded, a substantial risk to the plaintiff’s health and safety.231  
The second prong is considered the “subjective prong.”232  As such, a 
prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment 
for denying humane conditions of confinement unless the official was 
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 
substantial risk of harm existed, and actually drew that inference.233  
A defendant who did not treat an incarcerated individual properly 
because he or she did not realize how sick they were, or what the 
problem was, may not be deliberately indifferent due to a lack of 
actual knowledge.234 
It is unclear how courts will evaluate deliberate indifference claims 
that turn predominantly on a question about the quality of VTC care 
because federal courts have not yet examined the use of prison VTC 
as the gravamen of an Eighth Amendment claim.235  They have 
examined its use only tangentially and, even then, the issue has never 
                                                                                                                 
treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would recognize the 
necessity of a doctor’s attention). 
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242311 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2009); MacDonald v. Schriro, No. CV 04-1001-PHX-SMM, 
2008 WL 2783472 (D. Ariz. July 17, 2008); Coyle v. Cambra, No. 02-1810 SBA, 2005 
WL 2397517 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2005). 
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reached a circuit court of appeals.236  Additionally, as scholars 
frequently acknowledge, Eighth Amendment medical and mental 
health care cases are highly fact specific and can be difficult to win.237 
Federal court challenges to VTC, which have thus far focused only 
on medical care, are not particularly promising for plaintiffs.238  In 
those cases, courts have not second-guessed a corrections 
department’s reliance on the VTC.239  Instead, courts have been silent 
on VTC or passingly concluded that it did not pose a quality of care 
concern as applied to the plaintiff.240  Most courts that have addressed 
prison VTC have framed any disagreement with its use as a 
disagreement about “course of treatment,” insufficient to support an 
Eighth Amendment claim.241 
Although absent clear precedent for such a challenge, it is useful to 
examine two potentially applicable Eighth Amendment theories.  
Both of these theories may help a plaintiff overcome a dispositive 
motion, as has happened in one case involving VTC.  Similarly, these 
theories may help a plaintiff combat a defendant’s assertion that a 
reasonable mental health judgment was made during a VTC 
evaluation.242  Ultimately, however, even where these strategies are 
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successful, Eighth Amendment litigation cannot address the 
geographic problems raised in this Article without a concomitant 
grassroots approach. 
1. Defendant Failed to Conduct an Adequate Examination, Take 
an Adequate History, or Ask Necessary Questions243 
As explained above, scholars have found that VTC hampers 
communication between physicians and patients and interferes with 
the development of a therapeutic alliance.  Those endemic problems 
may inform an Eighth Amendment claim under one theory in 
particular—a plaintiff may bring a claim that the corrections officials 
were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s serious mental health 
needs where those officials failed to “inquire into essential facts.”  A 
long line of Eighth Amendment cases has established that such a 
claim is cognizable if an incarcerated plaintiff was not fully evaluated 
by prison mental health staff for a known, serious mental health need 
and was therefore harmed.244 
One of the few cases involving VTC at the district court level, 
MacDonald v. Schriro,245 turned on a “failure to inquire into essential 
facts” theory.246  In MacDonald, the plaintiff, Allan S. MacDonald, 
brought a deliberate indifference claim after a prison physician 
performed on him an extremely perfunctory VTC knee exam and 
therefore failed to fully assess his knee injury.247  The court denied 
the physician defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  Although 
the MacDonald court did not squarely address the quality of VTC 
medical services, one could reasonably conclude from the facts of the 
case that VTC enabled defendant’s perfunctory approach to 
MacDonald’s reported ailment. 
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judgment to Defendant physician who discontinued plaintiff’s psychotropic 
medication without reviewing plaintiff’s chart or conducting a proper psychiatric 
interview); see also Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 711 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that psychologist’s failure to follow up on clear suicidal ideation supported a 
deliberate indifference claim). 
 245. No. CV 04–1001–PHX–SMM (MHB), 2008 WL 2783472, at *3 (D. Ariz. 
July 17, 2008). 
 246. Id. at *3 (“Therefore, the crux of Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant rests 
upon his November 6, 2003 telemedicine appointment.  Plaintiff asserts that 
(1) Defendant failed to examine Plaintiff’s knee and ignored Plaintiff’s reported 
symptoms; (2) Defendant failed to read or obtain a copy of the June 11, 2003 MRI, 
despite the fact that Plaintiff told Defendant he was reading an outdated MRI . . . .”). 
 247. Id. 
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The record in MacDonald reflects that MacDonald received a 
subpar medical consult chiefly because that consult was conducted via 
VTC.  MacDonald presented evidence that during the course of the 
VTC consult, the physician never asked him to remove his long pants 
(which obscured his knee) or stand up.248  The physician instead 
recommended that MacDonald continue with the previously 
prescribed course of treatment—a knee brace and inflammatory 
drugs for pain—despite never having examined the knee or evaluated 
its health.249  MacDonald implored the physician to conduct a more 
thorough evaluation and to obtain and review his most recent MRI, 
to no avail.250  MacDonald saw the physician three years later and 
ultimately underwent knee surgery shortly thereafter.251  During that 
procedure, the surgeon noted possible recurrent left meniscus tears 
and a loose bone fragment.252 
MacDonald asserted, among other claims, that the physician acted 
with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by failing to 
adequately examine his knee during the VTC consult and by ignoring 
the symptoms he reported during that consult.253  MacDonald alleged 
that he attempted to convey to the physician what he was 
experiencing, and the results of his most recent MRI.254  Instead, the 
physician refused to review the new MRI or credit MacDonald’s 
report of his condition.255  Although MacDonald did not squarely 
challenge VTC, he made clear that VTC enabled the physician to all 
but ignore his assertions.256  One could easily posit that it is much 
harder to ignore reported symptoms during a one-on-one assessment 
than it is to ignore them during a VTC consult, particularly where a 
treating physician is not in the room with the patient and where the 
patient is not encouraged to develop any real rapport with the VTC 
consultant. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 248. Id. at *1. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at *3. 
 251. Id. at *1. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at *3. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. The court noted this in finding that the crux of MacDonald’s claim against the 
defendant rested upon his telemedicine appointment. Id. 
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MacDonald did not receive a merits decision in this case, but the 
court did deny the physician’s motion for summary judgment, 
reasoning that: 
A jury could infer that Defendant did not perform a physical 
examination on Plaintiff’s knee on November 6, 2003, did not listen 
to Plaintiff’s symptoms, and did not obtain or review Plaintiff’s June 
2003 MRI that revealed multiple bone infarcts.  The jury could also 
infer that these actions were deliberate, based on Plaintiff’s 
testimony that he tried to explain to [Defendant] that his injury was 
new and that a new MRI had been performed, but that Defendant 
refused to listen.257 
The court also found that a reasonable jury could conclude that the 
defendant’s deliberate indifference caused a three-year delay in the 
plaintiff’s surgery, which was sufficient to impose liability.258 
MacDonald reifies many concerns about VTC, even as applied to 
mental health evaluations.  Although psychiatrists do not perform 
physical examinations, they nonetheless must make observations that 
can be missed over VTC, such as observations of rapid movements 
and body language.259  Those observations are crucial to proper 
diagnoses, effective treatment, and the development of an 
understanding and a rapport between the clinician and the patient.260 
MacDonald’s legal theory was an effective one and should be 
considered for use where VTC exacerbates a physician’s failure to 
fully inquire into the conditions of an incarcerated plaintiff.  The 
record in MacDonald, and the literature on VTC’s deficiencies, make 
clear that courts should evaluate “failure to inquire” claims involving 
VTC in a fashion more favorable to the plaintiff.  Absent a significant 
change in the law, however, that is unlikely.  Furthermore, a plaintiff 
who pursues a deliberate indifference claim based upon this theory 
will have to establish, probably through expert testimony, that VTC 
does in fact hamper communication and discourage physicians from 
performing thorough examinations.  That claim would be weighed 
against well-established rules affording deference to prison officials in 
medical and mental health care cases and deference to professional 
judgment more generally.261 
                                                                                                                 
 257. Id. at *4. 
 258. Id. 
 259. See discussion supra Part I. 
 260. See discussion supra Part I. 
 261. See BOSTON & MANVILLE, supra note 220, at 41 nn.274–75. 
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2. Defendant Failed to Remedy Known Systemic Deficiencies, such 
as an Institutional Lack of Access to Qualified Staff or Repeated 
Failures to Afford Proper Placement262 
As explained earlier, some corrections departments have used 
VTC to avoid Eighth Amendment liability for failure to provide 
access to qualified specialist staff.  For some departments, however, 
expanded use of VTC may not be enough to avoid such liability.263  
And for departments that do not yet use VTC, the need for mental 
health services has so far outstripped the availability of qualified 
medical staff that the federal courts have taken notice.264  In a recent 
and particularly relevant case, Braggs v. Dunn,265 the Middle District 
of Alabama held that the Alabama Department of Corrections’ 
failure to hire and retain qualified psychiatric staff could support a 
deliberate indifference claim.266  Braggs, particularly its remedial 
process, is instructive for plaintiffs framing a challenge to VTC mental 
health treatment.267 
Prior to Braggs, advocates and journalists had written about the 
geographic sprawl of the Alabama prison system and its impact upon 
quality of care.268  In fact, legislation had been introduced to open 
                                                                                                                 
 262. This theory is based upon a theory articulated in BOSTON & MANVILLE, supra 
note 220, at 44, 58–64. 
 263. Though no court has so ruled, it is clear from precedent in cases turning on the 
availability of specialist care that any claim involving the provision of VTC as a 
substitute for in-person specialist care will turn largely upon the qualifications, 
training, and expertise of VTC consultants in the pertinent area of psychiatry. See id. 
at 44, 46–47. 
 264. Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1193 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (“Three 
conditions contribute to all of the deficiencies in [the Alabama Department of 
Corrections’] treatment of mentally ill prisoners: understaffing of mental-health care 
providers, understaffing of corrections officers, and overcrowding . . . .  Correctional 
and mental-health understaffing, both alone and in combination, impose substantial 
risks of serious harm to mentally ill prisoners, and overcrowding compounds these 
risks.”). 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 1208 (“Insufficient mental-health and correctional staffing at [the 
Alabama Department of Corrections] undermines the availability and quality of 
individual and group counseling sessions.  First, as explained earlier, inadequate 
mental-health staffing combined with the increasing number of prisoners on the 
mental-health caseload has driven up the number of prisoners on each counselor’s 
caseload.  As a result, both the frequency and quality of counseling sessions have 
suffered over time, according to both experts and MHM providers.”). 
 267. See generally id. 
 268. Kristen Connor, Governor Bentley Introduces Alabama Prison 
Transformation Initiative Act, WHNT NEWS19 (Feb. 23, 2016), http://whnt.com/2016/
02/23/governor-bentley-introduces-alabama-prison-transformation-initiative-act/ 
[https://perma.cc/2KWN-PFTB] (“The . . . design of the facilities are causing 
inefficiencies in the operation of the prison system, including . . . increasing costs of 
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new prisons to respond both to that sprawl, and to overcrowding.269  
Although most advocates argue that prison expansion is the wrong 
response to these issues,270 such proposals illustrate the extent to 
which sprawl has been linked to reduced quality of care in state 
prison systems.271  Braggs did not squarely challenge the location of 
Alabama’s prisons, but nonetheless challenged the overcrowding and 
quality of care issues that are clearly caused by the geographic 
dispersal of prisons systems.272 
Braggs, a case filed by several prisoners with mental health needs 
and the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program,273 was split by the 
court into three phases: Phase 1, Phase 2A, and Phase 2B, the last of 
which has yet to be fully litigated.274  Phase 1 encompassed ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act claims by incarcerated persons with physical 
disabilities.275  The claims in that phase were settled.276  Phase 2A 
includes Eighth Amendment, ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and due 
process claims by incarcerated persons with mental health care 
                                                                                                                 
transporting inmates from prison to medical care facilities, increasing correctional 
and support staff costs because of the geographic disparity of the system and the 
antiquated design of prison facilities, and increasing medical costs due to 
inefficiencies in delivering medical services to inmates.”). 
 269. Id.; see also Alabama Initiative to Support Construction of Four New Prisons, 
CORR. NEWS (Mar. 9, 2016), http://correctionalnews.com/2016/03/09/alabama-
initiative-support-construction-four-new-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/BS7N-DQWB] 
(“Outdated designs combined with age and deterioration is causing numerous 
operational problems throughout the prison system.  This includes increasing regular 
maintenance and repair costs, and increasing correctional and support staffing costs 
because of the geographic disparity of the system.”).  The bill was framed as a way to 
provide higher quality and increased rehabilitative programming. 
 270. Michelle Chen, How Closing a Jail Could Make New York City Stronger, THE 
NATION (May 17, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-closing-a-jail-could-
make-new-york-city-stronger/ [https://perma.cc/4TZW-BCWU] (explaining Rikers 
Island’s lack of proximity to the families of the incarcerated, lawyers, and social 
services, and quoting Alyxandra Goodwin of the Black Youth Project in support of 
full-on jail and prison abolition rather than jail and prison relocation). 
 271. See Robert J. Bentley, Former Governor of Ala., State of the State Address 
(Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2016/02/state_of_the_
state_full_text_o.html [https://perma.cc/7TV7-Y5ZQ] (stating that the Alabama 
Prison Transformation Initiative Act would close fourteen smaller, geographically 
disbursed prisons and open four “state of the art” regional prisons). 
 272. See generally Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171 (M.D. Ala. 2017). 
 273. Id. at 1178–79. 
 274. Id. at 1181–82.  Phase 2B will address Eighth Amendment claims related to 
medical and dental care. Id. 
 275. Id. at 1181 (noting the claims and disposition of Phase 1). 
 276. See Braggs v. Dunn, 318 F.R.D. 652, 658 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (granting final 
approval of the Phase 1 settlement). 
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needs.277  The ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims in Phase 2A were 
settled first.278  The due process challenges to involuntary medication 
policies and procedures were ultimately settled by the parties as 
well.279 
The Phase 2A Eighth Amendment claims, about which this Article 
is concerned, went to trial and were resolved on the merits.280  In its 
lengthy disposition, the court addressed a number of deficiencies in 
mental health care in Alabama State prisons, including screening, 
treatment, monitoring, and policies on housing and discipline of 
people with serious mental health needs.281  Deficiencies in each of 
those areas, driven partially by geographic issues, combined to 
establish an Eighth Amendment violation in Phase 2A of the 
litigation.282 
Braggs was fundamentally a challenge to major systemic and 
institutional deficiencies in mental health care in the Alabama State 
prisons system.283  Although the Alabama State prison system’s 
mental health case load consisted of 3400 people at the time of the 
Braggs filing,284 the system had only 346 general population mental 
health beds and 126 crisis beds.285  The Alabama Department of 
Corrections, the state agency responsible for operating Alabama’s 
state prisons, contracted with a for-profit entity to provide mental 
health services in its prisons.286  That entity provided meager numbers 
of mental health staff, though it repeatedly requested and was denied 
funding from the Alabama Department of Corrections to provide 
more staff.287 
                                                                                                                 
 277. Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1180 (detailing procedural background of “[t]his 
extremely complex case”). 
 278. See Braggs v. Dunn, 321 F.R.D. 653, 659 (M.D. Ala. July 25, 2017) (granting 
final approval of settlement of ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims for incarcerated 
persons with only mental disabilities).  While the court did not issue an opinion and 
final order until July, a preliminary approval of the settlement had been issued in 
February of 2017. Id. 
 279. See Braggs v. Dunn, No. 2:14cv601-MHT, 2017 WL 5665334, at *1, *9 (M.D. 
Ala. Nov. 27, 2017) (outlining the court’s rationale in approving the settlement on 
September 6, 2017). 
 280. Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1180. 
 281. Id. at 1267–68. 
 282. Id. at 1267 (“Simply put, [the Alabama Department of Corrections’] mental-
health care is horrendously inadequate.”). 
 283. Id. at 1180 (“The plaintiffs assert that the State of Alabama provides 
constitutionally inadequate mental-health care in prison facilities[.]”). 
 284. Id. at 1181. 
 285. See id. at 1182–83. 
 286. Id. at 1183–84. 
 287. Id. at 1194. 
482 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
The court found that lack of mental health staff and general prison 
overcrowding caused several instances of harm and substantial risks 
of harm sufficient to find Eighth Amendment violations on behalf of 
a class of individuals with mental health needs.288  Those systemic 
risks included: an inadequate intake process; inadequate referral 
process; inadequate classification of mental health needs; inadequate 
utilization of mental health units; inadequate treatment planning; 
inadequate psychotherapy; improper use of mental health units; 
inadequate out-of-cell time and programming; inadequate suicide 
prevention and crisis care; failure to provide crisis treatment to those 
who need it; placement of people who need crisis cells into an 
inappropriate environment; unsafe crisis cells; inadequate monitoring 
of individuals displaying suicidality; inappropriate release from 
suicide watch; and inadequate follow up.289 
The remedial process of Phase 2A of Braggs continues as of 
January 2018.290  Advocates should follow that process closely.291  If 
the Alabama Department of Corrections closes some of its mental 
health treatment resource gaps by utilizing VTC, it may ultimately fail 
to provide treatment of the quality it could provide with a sufficient 
number of on-site mental health professionals.292  Braggs will provide 
a blueprint case theory for addressing deficiencies attendant to 
                                                                                                                 
 288. Id. at 1193.  The Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections 
described his own prison system as “wrestling with a ‘two-headed monster’: 
overcrowding and understaffing.” Id. at 1184.  The court noted overcrowding, 
understaffing, and the compounding risks associated with both conditions throughout 
its opinion. See, e.g., id. at 1194–95 (“The sheer magnitude of overcrowding within 
[the Alabama Department of Corrections] has meant that some [Alabama 
Department of Corrections] facilities . . . house more than double the number of 
prisoners they are designed to hold . . . .  [The Alabama Department of Corrections] 
has maintained mental-health staffing levels that are chronically insufficient across 
disciplines and facilities.  Witness after witness identified significant mental-health 
staffing shortages as one of the major reasons for [the Alabama Department of 
Corrections’] inability to meet the rising mental health care needs of prisoners.”). 
 289. See id. at 1192–93.  The court discusses each of these risks in great detail. See 
generally id. at 1191–1250. 
 290. See Phase 2A Order Modifying Order on Hospital-Level Care Remedy, 
Braggs v. Dunn, No. 2:14-cv-601-MHT (M.D. Ala. Jan. 11, 2018) (No. 1542) 
(scheduling hearings for January 29, 2018 and February 5, 2018 to address part of 
remedial steps).  
 291. It remains to be seen whether the remedy will satisfy the court’s call for 
immediate and long-term solutions. See Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1268 (“The court 
emphasizes that given the severity and urgency of the need for mental-health care 
explained in this opinion, the proposed relief must be both immediate and long 
term.”). 
 292. For examples of the deficiencies that may accompany the use of VTC in this 
remedial process, see supra Section I.B. 
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VTC,293 as VTC leads to many of the same risks of harm already 
identified by the court.294  If the remedial process does not make a 
major systemic impact, Braggs will demonstrate what other cases 
have demonstrated—that courts have limited power to address the 
underlying geographic sprawl that creates the resource problems they 
identify.295 
In Coyle v. Cambra296 and Rouse v. Caruso,297 courts addressed 
similar systemic issues, although those issues were not framed 
through a geographic lens.  In Coyle, plaintiff Travis Coyle brought a 
deliberate indifference claim based upon defendants’ failure to 
provide “adequate, timely, and necessary specialist medical care” for 
his knee.298  Before he brought the case, Coyle filed a prison 
grievance and requested a meeting with an orthopedist concerning his 
knee injury, only to receive a response over two weeks later stating 
that because the prison’s contract with orthopedists had expired and 
had not been renewed, he would have to be seen through 
telemedicine.299  Coyle appealed that grievance response five days 
later, explicitly arguing that telemedicine was inadequate.300  He did 
not receive a response to that appeal, but was eventually seen a 
second time by the prison’s primary care physician instead, who 
decided to continue to treat Coyle with medication for his condition 
and await the telemedicine conference.301  The telemedicine 
conference never took place because the applicable waiting list was 
full and the prison entered into a new contract with an on-site 
orthopedist before Coyle advanced on that list.302 
To support his deliberate indifference claim, Coyle alleged that 
specialists simply were not available during contract renegotiations, 
implying that telemedicine did not afford true access to specialists.303  
                                                                                                                 
 293. See generally Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1267–68 (detailing the scope of the 
Eighth Amendment violations). 
 294. See discussion supra Section I.B (highlighting deficiencies in VTC mental 
health treatment through correspondence between the Justice Center and Disability 
Rights New York and DOCCS and OMH regarding the use of VTC in New York 
State prisons). 
 295. The Braggs court, despite issuing a lengthy opinion, did not address the state 
of prison mental health in Alabama through a geographic lens. 
 296. No. C 02-1810 SBA PR, 2005 WL 2397517 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2005). 
 297. No. 06–10961, 2009 WL 891728 (E.D. Mich. Mar 31, 2009). 
 298. Coyle, 2005 WL 2397517, at *7. 
 299. Id. at *3–4. 
 300. Id. at *4. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. at *7. 
484 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
The Court disagreed with Coyle and granted summary judgment to 
defendants.304 
Coyle’s argument was similar to the plaintiff’s argument in 
MacDonald v. Schriro,305 discussed above.  MacDonald was subjected 
to the exact type of telemedicine consultation that Coyle sought to 
avoid306—a perfunctory assessment by a clinician who neither 
credited the patient’s complaints nor fully examined relevant 
records.307  Like MacDonald, Coyle argued that the VTC medium 
aided the incompleteness of his consultation.308  Unfortunately, the 
court did not evaluate Coyle’s VTC argument that telemedicine was 
inadequate and that therefore necessary specialist care was not made 
available.309  Instead, the court endorsed the defendants’ argument 
that the defendants were not responsible for the delay and that, in 
consideration of Coyle’s multiple appointments with medical staff 
between 2000 and 2002, he received reasonable care under the 
circumstances.310 
The court held that even if the defendants were negligent, 
negligence is not sufficient to support a deliberate indifference 
claim.311  Neither are most “[differences] of medical opinion,” which 
is how the court described the dispute between Coyle and the 
defendants.312  The court emphasized that a plaintiff can make out a 
deliberate indifference claim based upon a difference of opinion only 
where they can show that the course of treatment doctors performed 
was “medically unacceptable under the circumstances” and chosen in 
“disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.”313  In this 
particular situation, the court pointed to the fact that the physicians 
had seen the plaintiff and had evaluated his symptoms in response to 
his complaints, and that plaintiff’s allegations therefore did not rise 
beyond a simple difference of opinion.314  The court therefore granted 
                                                                                                                 
 304. Id. at *15. 
 305. No. CV 04–1001–PHX–SMM (MHB), 2008 WL 2783472, at *3 (D. Ariz. 
July 17, 2008). 
 306. Coyle, 2005 WL 2397517, at *3. 
 307. Compare Coyle, 2005 WL 2397517, at *9–12, with MacDonald, 2008 WL 
2783472, at *1. 
 308. Coyle, 2005 WL 2397517, at *9–12. 
 309. Id. at *9–13. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. at *8. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at *9. 
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the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Coyle 
had not made such showing.315 
A major difference between MacDonald and Coyle is that 
MacDonald confined his argument to the quality of the evaluation he 
personally received, whereas Coyle explicitly tied his argument to his 
displeasure with VTC as a medium.316  The Coyle court did not 
consider that disagreement, but confined its analysis to the quality of 
care that Coyle received.317  This distinction is material in our 
assessment of whether courts are willing to address systemic issues 
related to the provision of VTC, or are more likely to address VTC’s 
deficiencies as applied to particular plaintiffs. 
In Rouse v. Caruso, the Eastern District of Michigan similarly 
confined its analysis and failed to reach the systemic issue raised by 
the plaintiff.318  The Rouse court held that it could not enjoin the 
Michigan Department of Corrections’s telemedicine policy as the 
plaintiff, Arthur Rouse, had not proven that it was 
unconstitutional.319  Rouse had alleged—and the defendants did not 
dispute—that the Michigan Department of Correction did not 
maintain medical staff at the Mid-Michigan/Pine River Correctional 
Facility320 after 8:00 p.m. or on the weekends, and that telemedical 
services were afforded only during “life threatening emergencies” 
pursuant to the applicable policy.321  The defendants admitted that 
staff vacancies had caused a reduction in hours and that the inability 
to fill those vacancies was caused by the absence of viable candidates, 
but maintained that “just because Mid-Michigan does not have 
medical staff present in the facility for eight hours a day does not 
establish that Plaintiff has not received adequate or appropriate 
                                                                                                                 
 315. Id. at *13. 
 316. Compare MacDonald, 2008 WL 2783472, at *3, with Coyle, 2005 WL 2387517, 
at *3. 
 317. Coyle, 2005 WL 2397517, at *8. 
 318. Rouse v. Caruso, No. 06–10961, 2009 WL 891728, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Mar 31, 
2009). 
 319. Id. 
 320. Mid-Michigan Correctional Facility and Pine River Correctional Facility have 
since been consolidated.  The consolidated facility is called Central Michigan 
Correctional Facility. Prison Directory, MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., 
http://www.michigan.gov/corrections/0,4551,7-119-68854_1381_1385—-,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/DG28-YSE7].  It is located in Gratiot County, Michigan, an area 
noted for its lack of physicians. CITIZENS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICH., WHERE ARE 
THE PRIMARY CARE DOCTORS? A LOOK AT MICHIGAN’S PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIAN 
SHORTAGE 7–11, app. B (2015). 
 321. Rouse, 2009 WL 891728, at *4. 
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medical care.”322  The defendants disputed Rouse’s reading of the 
applicable telemedicine policy, which was that the policy permitted 
diagnoses over the phone.323  Although it did not resolve the factual 
dispute regarding the applicable telemedicine policy, the court 
determined that any decision to enjoin the policy would be 
premature, albeit acknowledging that the policy could be read to 
permit phone diagnoses.324 
B. A Grassroots Approach is Necessary to Correct the Systemic 
Problems Litigation Usually Cannot Address 
As illustrated above, the viability of challenging VTC using an 
Eighth Amendment theory is questionable at best.  Most advocates 
agree that VTC is here to stay and devote attention to either closing 
the general prison medical care resources gap,325 or to other 
initiatives that promise to improve prison medical care generally.326  
One such initiative is the closure of prisons and their relocation to 
more resource-rich areas, both as a response to medical and mental 
health resource issues and as a response to other problems caused by 
prisons’ geographic isolation.327  Those initiatives, particularly where 
pursued by grassroots organizations, have at times succeeded.328  
They present greater prospects for successful systemic change than 
                                                                                                                 
 322. Id. at *5. 
 323. Id. at *6. 
 324. Id. at *8. 
 325. The American Civil Liberties Union, Perkins Coie, Jones Day, and the 
Arizona Center for Disability Law, for example, recently settled a case against 
several Arizona Department of Corrections senior officials.  Included in the 
stipulation of settlement is a provision that requires the Arizona Department of 
Corrections to provide telemedicine practitioners with their patient’s recent medical 
records before a telemedicine consultation. Stipulation at 12, Parsons v. Ryan, No. 
CV 12-00601-PHX-DJH (D. Ariz. Oct. 14, 2014); see also Ollove, supra note 46 
(“[David] Fathi, of the [American Civil Liberties Union], said too often, doctors 
practicing telemedicine on inmates don’t have their full medical histories.  That was a 
federal court’s finding in a recent lawsuit concerning prison health care in Arizona 
penitentiaries.  One provision of the court-approved settlement in the case requires 
mental health providers practicing telemedicine on prisoners be provided with their 
recent medical records, including laboratory results. ‘Telemedicine does offer some 
positives but it is never going to be as good as having an on-site physician who can 
perform hands-on diagnosis and treatment,’ Fathi said.”). 
 326. See, e.g., CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., HEALTH CARE IN NEW YORK STATE PRISONS: 
A REPORT OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE PRISON VISITING 
COMMITTEE OF THE CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK 69–80 (2000), 
https://static.prisonpolicy.org/scans/healthcare.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZ5L-VHY4]. 
 327. See discussion infra Part III. 
 328. See discussion infra Part III. 
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does litigation alone, as they address the underlying geographic cause 
of VTC, not merely the problems VTC causes. 
III.  A GRASSROOTS SOLUTION TO THE GEOGRAPHIC CRISIS 
CAUSING SUBPAR PRISON MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT 
The litigation landscape cannot singlehandedly improve VTC, 
reverse its use, or cure the geographic problems causing its use.329  
But even where litigation is the best tool, and even where it succeeds, 
it often creates only fleeting change.330  That is because no litigation 
lasts forever, and lawyers representing defendants in civil rights cases 
use ample tools—sunset dates, termination motions, and the like—to 
skirt permanent implementation of private settlement agreements 
and consent decrees.331  In the prison and jail context, some of those 
tools were created by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which limits 
the scope and duration of consent decrees.332  Because of litigation’s 
structural limitations, it is an imperfect tool to achieve widespread 
systemic change.333  When paired with grassroots activism, however, 
litigation serves as a much more potent tool to create that change.334 
Two New York-based organizations are most instructive in pairing 
grassroots and litigation models—Mental Health Alternatives to 
Solitary Confinement (“MHASC”),335 and #CLOSErikers.336  Neither 
                                                                                                                 
 329. See supra Section II.A (discussing the Eighth Amendment framework). 
 330. See generally Beth Van Schaack, With All Deliberate Speed: Civil Human 
Rights Litigation as a Tool for Social Change, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2305 (2004) (“[T]his 
essay cautions that such litigation should not replace other forms of human rights 
advocacy.  An over-reliance on adversarial litigation, as opposed to other processes 
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 331. A sunset date is a date upon which a private settlement agreement or a 
consent decree will end.  Defendants often attempt good faith implementation of a 
private settlement agreement only until the sunset date.  If the parties have not 
agreed on a sunset date, defendants may file a termination motion and argue that 
they have substantially complied with the terms of the agreement. 
 332. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626 (West 2017). 
 333. Ronald Slye, Community Institution Building: A Response to the Limits of 
Litigation in Addressing the Problem of Homelessness, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1035, 1045, 
1049–54 (1991) (explaining why litigation is “a poor tool for comprehensively 
addressing broad and complex social issues that require long-term structural 
solutions” irrespective of the doctrinal landscape). 
 334. Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering: Navigating the 
Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1999, 2057–61 (2007); 
Judith E. Kroons, Fair Housing and Community Empowerment: Where the Roof 
Meets Redemption, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 75, 87–93 (1996). 
 335. Hearing on Mental Illness in Correctional Settings Before the New York State 
Assembly Standing Committees on Correction and Mental Health, 2014 Leg. (2014) 
(statement of Mental Health Alternatives to Solitary Confinement, describing the 
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organization has litigated in its own name, but both count among its 
members people who have litigated to combat the issues the 
respective groups were formed to combat and both organizations 
have utilized litigation in their multi-pronged advocacy efforts.337  
Although MHASC and #CLOSErikers do not focus solely on prison 
siting issues, each has included those issues in their analyses.338  They 
have secured major positive changes in the allocation of prison and 
jail resources, and can serve as models for the multi-pronged 
strategies advocates should use to reduce the sprawl of the New York 
State prison system and force DOCCS and OMH to utilize the mental 
health resources that exist only near urban centers.339 
MHASC provides the best example of a grassroots organization 
channeling a major litigation victory into permanent change.  Prior 
MHASC’s creation, lawyers had worked since the 1980s to improve 
the treatment of people with mental health needs in solitary 
confinement in New York State, predominantly through litigation.340  
For example, the State settled Langley v. Coughlin,341 Eng v. 
Goord,342 and Anderson v. Goord 343 in the 1980s and 1990s, all of 
which challenged subpar mental health treatment in New York’s 
                                                                                                                 
organization as “a coalition of more than sixty organizations and hundreds of 
concerned citizens, advocates, mental health and criminal justice professionals, 
formerly incarcerated people, and their family members [that advocates] for humane 
criminal justice policies for people with psychiatric disabilities”). 
 336. #CLOSERIKERS, http://www.closerikers.org/ [https://perma.cc/E9Z8-Y4FB].  
Other organizations, such as the Committee to End the Marion Lockdown, the New 
York City Jails Action Coalition, and Critical Resistance have combatted prison 
siting issues and problems attendant to the geography of America’s mass 
incarceration epidemic.  Those organizations have further illustrated the power of 
multi-pronged, grassroots approaches, though their work is not addressed in this 
Article. 
 337. See discussion infra Part III. 
 338. Tanya Christian, #CLOSErikers: Here’s Why the Entire Country Should Be 
Paying Attention, ESSENCE (May 8, 2017), https://www.essence.com/news/glenn-
martin-close-rikers-campaign [http://perma.cc/5SCM-7UFA] (quoting Glenn Martin, 
founder of #CLOSErikers, concerning the unique issue of Rikers Island’s location); 
see also 2017 Meeting Minutes, supra note 190. 
 339. See discussion infra Part III. 
 340. See discussion infra Part III. 
 341. Stipulation and Order, Langley v. Coughlin, 84 Civ. 5431 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 
1989). 
 342. Settlement Agreement, Eng v. Goord, 80 Civ. 385S (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 1998).  
For the report required by Eng, see STUART GRASSIAN, ENG SITE VISIT ONE (1999), 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/Grassian_Report_Eng_Site_Visit_One.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F7A9-25V2]. 
 343. Settlement Agreement, Anderson v. Goord, 87 Civ. 141 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 
2003) (on file with author). 
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prisons, particularly for people in solitary confinement.  Langley,344 in 
particular, was brought on behalf of a class of individuals incarcerated 
at Bedford Hills Correctional Facility.  Those cases brought 
temporary change to individual facilities, but did not have the type of 
lasting systemic impact plaintiffs had hoped for.345  In fact, over 
fifteen years after the Langley Stipulation346 was implemented, 
incarcerated individuals with serious mental health needs continued 
to be placed in solitary confinement not only at Bedford Hills 
Correctional Facility, but statewide.347 
Community activists, advocates, and lawyers determined that they 
could address systemic problems only by developing a new grassroots 
strategy guided by people directly affected by those problems.  They 
envisioned a movement that used three tools—litigation, legislation, 
and public education—rather than a movement that fought battles 
only in the courtroom.348  MHASC was created shortly before 
Disability Advocates, Inc. v. New York State Office of Mental Health 
was filed, in pursuit of that type of movement.349  Both before and 
during the litigation, members of MHASC engaged in a public 
education campaign concerning the issues raised in the litigation.350  
They attended community meetings with the National Alliance on 
Mental Illness351 and New York Association of Psychiatric 
Rehabilitation Services,352 testified at public hearings on mental 
                                                                                                                 
 344. Langley, 84 Civ. 5431. 
 345. Reassessing Solitary Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public 
Safety Consequences, Hearing Before the Sen. Judiciary Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, 112th Cong. 2–3 (2012) (statement of 
Sarah Kerr, Staff Attorney, Legal Aid Society, Prisoners’ Rights Project). 
 346. Langley, 84 Civ. 5431. 
 347. Sarah Kerr, Litigation and Legislation Efforts to Improve Mental Health 
Treatment for Prisoners in New York, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE PRISON LAW 
2010, at 15 (2010) (on file with author). 
 348. See Implementation of Special Housing Unit (SHU) Exclusion Law Providing 
Effective Mental Health Treatment in Prison Suicides, Hearing Before the Assemb. 
Comms. on Corr. & Mental Health, 2011 Leg. 2 (2011) (statement of Sarah Kerr, 
Staff Attorney, Legal Aid Society, Prisoners’ Rights Project).  
 349. See id.; Press Release, N.Y. Ass’n of Psychiatric Rehabilitation Servs., GNS, 
TU: Sponsors Pledge SHU Bill Passage to Assure Permanent Policy Change in NYS 
(Apr. 18, 2007); see also History, MENTAL HEALTH ALTERNATIVES TO SOLITARY 
CONFINEMENT, https://boottheshu.wordpress.com/history/ [https://perma.cc/2YG4-
UJ9W]; discussion supra Introduction. 
 350. See sources cited supra notes 348–49. 
 351. For more information on this institution, see NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, 
https://www.nami.org/ [https://perma.cc/3E88-C5HK]. 
 352. For more information on this institution, see N.Y. ASS’N OF PSYCHIATRIC 
REHABILITATION SERVS., INC., http://www.nyaprs.org/ [https://perma.cc/5E93-FZAZ]. 
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health care in state prisons,353 and prepared reports about the 
mistreatment of people with mental health needs in solitary 
confinement.354  MHASC’s public education campaign created the 
groundswell for the first iteration of the SHU Exclusion Bill, 
introduced in 2003.355  By the time Disability Advocates, Inc. had 
settled,356 the second iteration of the SHU Exclusion Bill had already 
passed the New York State Legislature and been vetoed by then 
Governor George Pataki.357 
Because of the sustained public pressure created by MHASC, that 
veto did not kill the bill.  The bill also did not die in its third iteration, 
which passed the New York State Legislature but was amended after 
further negotiation with the governor’s office.358  In 2008, less than a 
year after the state settled Disability Advocates, Inc., a then-amended 
SHU Exclusion Bill was passed and signed into law by Governor 
Spitzer.359  Governor Paterson later proposed amendments to the 
SHU Exclusion Law that would have undercut many of the law’s 
specific requirements.360  Thanks in part to the impact of MHASC’s 
public education campaign, the legislature rejected those changes 
after a lengthy hearing.361  The SHU Exclusion Law has helped to 
mitigate the impact of the end of the Disability Advocates, Inc. 
settlement in late 2011.362 
                                                                                                                 
 353. See Press Release, Mental Health Alternatives to Solitary Confinement, As 
Bill Ending State’s Practice of Solitary Confinement of Prisoners Moves Ahead in 
NYS Legislature, Advocates Call for Prompt Passage and Approval by Governor in 
the Twelve Remaining Days of Session (2007), https://mhp.urbanjustice.org/sites/
default/files/MHASC_Press_Release_2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/64MJ-RC4M]. 
 354. See id.; see also Historical Documents, MENTAL HEALTH ALTERNATIVES TO 
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, https://boottheshu.wordpress.com/history/historical-
documents/ [https://perma.cc/W84H-SG25]. 
 355. A.B. A08849A, Reg. Sess. 2003–2004 (N.Y. 2003). 
 356. See Private Settlement Agreement, supra note 25, at 31. 
 357. See A.B. A3926A, Reg. Sess. 2005–2006 (N.Y. 2006); S.B. S2207C, Reg. Sess. 
2005–2006 (N.Y. 2006); see also Sol Wachtler, Opinion, A Cell of One’s Own, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/opinion/
nyregionopinions/24CIwachtler.html [https://nyti.ms/2FnsOfW]. 
 358. See A.B. A4870, Reg. Sess. 2007–2008 (N.Y. 2007); S.B. S00333B, Reg. Sess. 
2007–2008 (N.Y. 2007); “Boot the SHU” Bill Becomes Law in New York, 18 PRO SE 
MAG., Winter 2008, at 2 (“Governor Spitzer’s office worked with Assembly and 
Senate leaders to modify the bill in accordance with information from DOCS and 
OMH leadership.”).  
 359. See A.B. A09342, Reg. Sess. 2007–2008 (N.Y. 2008); S.B. S06422, Reg. Sess. 
2007–2008 (N.Y. 2008); see also 2008 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1 (McKinney). 
 360. See sources cited supra notes 348–49. 
 361. See sources cited supra notes 348–49. 
 362. Private Settlement Agreement, supra note 25, at 27. 
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Although the SHU Exclusion Law did not codify all of the 
protections of the Disability Advocates, Inc. private settlement 
agreement, it codified many of the most crucial ones.363  Most 
notably, the SHU Exclusion Law greatly restricted the placement of 
individuals with serious mental health needs in solitary 
confinement.364  As opposed to the litigation-only strategies pursued 
during the 1980s and 1990s, the three-prong strategy utilized during 
the 2000s through MHASC achieved a more sustained systemic 
impact.365  Although problems remain, quality of care has improved 
and the census of people with mental health needs in solitary 
confinement has dropped.366  MHASC achieved ever-elusive systemic 
change. 
Without MHASC’s work, the Disability Advocates, Inc. private 
settlement agreement367 may have suffered the dismal fate of similar 
agreements in prison cases—defendants may have been tempted to 
dismantle any gains won by litigators after the end of monitoring and 
the conclusion of the settlement’s term.368  Today, MHASC continues 
to build upon the SHU Exclusion Law in its biannual meetings with 
the Justice Center and its close collaboration with other advocacy 
groups to expand mental health treatment options in the state 
                                                                                                                 
 363. See discussion supra Section II.A (detailing the private settlement agreement 
and the SHU Exclusion Law). 
 364. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 137.6(d)(i) (McKinney 2017). 
 365. Kerr, supra note 347, at 15–22. 
 366. Mental Health Services in NY Prisons, Hearing Before the Assemb. Comms. 
on Corr. & Mental Health 1 (2014) (statement of Jack Beck, Dir., Prison Visiting 
Project, Corr. Ass’n of N.Y.) (“As a result of intense scrutiny and demand for 
enhanced services by prison mental health patients, their families, the legislature, 
courts, and prison and mental health advocates, DOCCS and OMH have increased 
and in some cases improved mental health services over the last decade.  Most 
significantly, in large part because of a 2007 litigation settlement in Disability 
Advocates, Inc. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, and the Special Housing 
Unit (SHU) Exclusion Law—passed by the NYS legislature in 2008 and gone into full 
effect in July 2011—there has been a diversion of people with the most serious 
mental illness (SMI or S-designated) from solitary confinement, and a substantial 
increase in the number of both disciplinary and non-disciplinary Residential Mental 
Health Treatment Units (RMHTUs).”). 
 367. See generally Private Settlement Agreement, supra note 25. 
 368. See, e.g., Health Care in New York State Prisons, Hearing Before the 
Assemb. Comms. on Corr. & Health, at 5–7 (Oct. 30, 2017) (statement of Stefen R. 
Short, Staff Attorney, Prisoners’ Rights Project of the Legal Aid Society of N.Y.C.) 
(concerning the dismantling of the reforms mandated by the consent decree in 
Milburn v. Coughlin, 79 Civ. 5077 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (modified final judgment)); see 
also Letter from author to Cathy Sheehan, Deputy Counsel, N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. & 
Cmty. Supervision, 1–2 (Aug. 29, 2017) (concerning DOCCS’s rollback of a major 
reform mandated by the private settlement agreement in Medina v. Fischer, 11-cv-
176 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) which had expired in May 2017). 
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prisons.369  MHASC’s work achieved the re-allocation of state 
resources to provide improved and more widespread treatment 
options for incarcerated individuals with mental health needs.370  
Although geographic problems remain, the resource re-allocation 
that drove the implementation of the SHU Exclusion Law is proof of 
what is possible. 
#CLOSErikers is another example of a movement that has built off 
of the success of decades of litigation and public advocacy by not only 
lawyers, but advocates, activists, and, most notably, people who are 
directly impacted by the scourge of Rikers.  Rikers Island is a 400-
acre island in the East River that serves as New York City’s main jail 
complex.371  The island is notorious for its culture of violence and 
staff brutality, inhumane conditions of confinement, and woeful 
medical and mental health treatment.372  Family members, friends, 
and advocates must make an arduous journey to reach the island, 
because of its remote geographic location and poor public 
transportation options.373  Each of these problems has been 
documented extensively over several decades in multiple forums—
newspapers have written about them,374 federal courts have 
documented them in their opinions,375 and advocates have testified to 
                                                                                                                 
 369. See, e.g., 2017 Meeting Minutes, supra note 190. 
 370. See discussion supra Part III. 
 371. Michael Schwirtz, What Is Rikers Island?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/nyregion/rikers-island-prison-new-york.html 
[https://nyti.ms/2oJAH6O]. 
 372. See, e.g., U.S. ATTORNEY FOR THE S. DIST. OF N.Y., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CRIPA INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
JAILS ON RIKERS ISLAND 4–51 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-
sdny/legacy/2015/03/25/SDNY%20Rikers%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QPB-2V
DK] (regarding a Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act investigation of the 
New York City Department of Correction jails on Rikers Island); see also Dana 
Goldstein et al., Inside Rikers Island, by the People Who Live It, N.Y. MAG. (Jun. 28, 
2015, 9:00 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/06/inside-rikers-island-
interviews.html [https://perma.cc/YV3R-LDRW]. 
 373. See Edgar Sandoval & Sarah Ryley, Activists Slam de Blasio’s Plan to 
Renovate Rikers Island ‘Hell,’ N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 18, 2017, 11:41 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/activists-slam-de-blasio-plan-renovate-rikers-
island-hell-article-1.3002003 [https://perma.cc/G6NB-CEJ5] (discussing Rikers 
Island’s remote location). 
 374. See, e.g., The Editorial Board, Opinion, A Culture of Violence on Rikers 
Island, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/opinion/a-
culture-of-violence-at-rikers-island.html [https://nyti.ms/2Fkmd5Z]. 
 375. See, e.g., Fisher v. Koehler, 692 F. Supp. 1519, 1521 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(“Systematic deficiencies in the operation of [the Correctional Institution for Men on 
Rikers Island], most significantly, overcrowding, overreliance on open dormitory 
housing, lack of adequate classification, inadequate staffing and supervision, and 
inadequate systems for controlling, investigating and disciplining misuse of force have 
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them in front of New York City Council376 and the New York City 
Board of Correction.377 
#CLOSErikers is a movement led by formerly incarcerated 
individuals who are affiliated with the nonprofit 
JustLeadershipUSA.378  #CLOSErikers kicked off its work in 2016 
and within one year, it achieved its core demand: in 2017, New York 
City Major Bill de Blasio committed to closing Rikers.379  The success 
of #CLOSErikers is tied in large part to a multi-pronged effort 
spanning many decades. 
For decades, horrendous conditions at Rikers have been the 
subject of litigation and advocacy.  By many accounts, New York 
City’s modern jail reform saga began in 1970 with the death of Young 
Lord Julio Roldán at Manhattan Detention Center, often referred to 
as “the Tombs.”380  Roldán’s death mobilized the community against 
the decrepit conditions in the New York City jails, and mobilized the 
                                                                                                                 
led to a world where inmates suffer physical abuse, both by other inmates and by 
staff, in a chillingly routine and random fashion.”). 
 376. See generally, e.g., Examining Violence in New York City Jails and the City’s 
Response, Oversight Hearing Before the New York City Council (May 6, 2015) 
(statement of the N.Y. Civil Liberties Union), https://www.nyclu.org/en/publications/
testimony-regarding-city-councils-examination-violence-nycs-jails [https://perma.cc/
5S6R-WFGX]. 
 377. Hearing on Proposed Rule Regarding Enhanced Supervision Housing, Before 
the N.Y.C. Bd. of Corr., at 8–9 (Dec. 19, 2014) (statement of Gabrielle Horowitz-
Prisco, Dir., Juvenile Justice Project, Corr. Ass’n of N.Y.), http://www1.nyc.gov/
assets/boc/downloads/pdf/Correctional%20Association%20(Revised%20and%20Origi
nal).pdf [https://perma.cc/FWQ8-2Q65] (“In discussing the sheer brutality children 
and adults on Rikers Island face day in and out, we want to acknowledge that these 
problems long preceded the current Department of Correction (DOC) and city 
administration . . . . The Department of Justice Report is shocking not for its 
revelations—the violence on Rikers, including that against children, was made public 
long ago.  What is shocking is how little has been done to protect the children and 
adults on Rikers, despite this knowledge.  The tentacles of brutality on Rikers are 
historic and deep.”). 
 378. See JustLeadershipUSA—Campaign to Close Rikers, OPEN PHILANTHROPY 
PROJECT (Feb. 2016), https://www.openphilanthropy.org/focus/us-policy/criminal-
justice-reform/justleadershipusa-close-rikers-campaign [https://perma.cc/DSU2-
M5PC]. 
 379. See Bill de Blasio, Mayor of the City of New York, Statement from Mayor 
Bill de Blasio on Closure of Rikers Island (Mar. 31, 2017), http://www1.nyc.gov/
office-of-the-mayor/news/193-17/statement-mayor-bill-de-blasio-closure-rikers-
island#/0 [https://perma.cc/F6ZS-TFDR]; see also How Do We Close Rikers?, 
#CLOSERIKERS (Oct. 3, 2017), http://www.closerikers.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/
10/closerikers-10years-demands.pdf [https://perma.cc/5D83-DKCR]. 
 380. See Jason B. Nicholas, A History of Hell: How Rikers Island Became a 
Modern Municipal Abomination, VILLAGE VOICE (Apr. 11, 2017), 
https://www.villagevoice.com/2017/04/11/a-history-of-hell-how-rikers-island-became-
a-modern-municipal-abomination/ [https://perma.cc/LH5V-E453]. 
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New York City Board of Correction and the Legal Aid Society to 
take action.381  The Legal Aid Society subsequently filed several 
major cases about conditions in the New York City jails, including 
Rikers Island.382 
One outcome of this litigation was that it forced city officials, at 
least briefly, to confront the problems stemming from the geographic 
isolation of Rikers Island.  In 1978, with numerous class actions still 
pending and with conditions in city jails at a nadir, Mayor Ed Koch 
appointed Herb Sturz Deputy Mayor for Criminal Justice.383  Deputy 
Mayor Sturz was keenly aware of the conditions in the city jails and 
endeavored to fix them.384  As a first step, he agreed to consolidate 
and settle pending class action cases concerning conditions on Rikers 
Island and he proposed to sell the island to New York State and move 
detainees to new, modern facilities in each borough.385  He was later 
quoted as stating that the idea was to “put[ ] accused persons right 
near the courthouse and closer to their families.”386  Unfortunately, 
that plan fell through due to pushback from unions and uncertain 
legislative prospects.387  In the 1980s and 1990s, before Rikers could 
be “fixed,” “tough on crime” policies and the city’s response to the 
crack epidemic combined to balloon the population on Rikers Island 
and in other city jails.388  As discussed earlier, the criminalization of 
mental health needs also played a role in this development.389 
                                                                                                                 
 381. See id. 
 382. See, e.g., Arroyo v. Schaefer, 548 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1977); Detainees of 
Brooklyn House of Det. v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 394 (2d Cir. 1975); Rhem v. 
Malcolm, 527 F.2d 1041, 1042 (2d Cir. 1975); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.3d 333, 335 (2d 
Cir. 1974); Valvano v. McGrath, 325 F. Supp. 408, 412–13 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 383. Mark Schmitt, The Persuasion Broker, AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 19, 2009), 
http://prospect.org/article/persuasion-broker [https://perma.cc/3LUE-JLX4] (“Sturz 
entered government in 1978, serving as deputy major and later as planning 
commissioner in the early years of Mayor Ed Koch, an underappreciated period of 
innovation and change in New York City.”). 
 384. See Nicholas, supra note 380. 
 385. Id.  
 386. Id.  
 387. Clyde Haberman, Rikers Sale Proposal ‘Dead,’ Commissioner Asserts, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 1981), http://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/03/nyregion/rikers-sale-
proposal-dead-commissioner-asserts.html [https://perma.cc/KSZ9-C637]. 
 388. See Timothy Egan, Crack’s Legacy: A Special Report; A Drug Ran Its 
Course, Then Hid with Its Users, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/19/us/crack-s-legacy-a-special-report-a-drug-ran-its-
course-then-hid-with-its-users.html [https://nyti.ms/2kFpvsN] (“Over the last 10 
years, the New York police made nearly 900,000 drug arrests—more than any other 
city in the world. Almost a third were for using and selling crack. But a broader look 
at the arc of the crack years suggests that it was not the incarceration of a generation, 
or the sixfold increase in the number of police officers assigned to narcotics, that 
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The Legal Aid Society’s consolidated class action—now known as 
Benjamin v. Brann390—is still pending before the Southern District of 
New York with major systemic issues still unaddressed.391  The 
Prisoners’ Rights Project of the Legal Aid Society continues to 
litigate that case, which is now over forty-two years old, underscoring 
the intractable nature of the problems at Rikers.392  The Prisoners’ 
Rights Project has also litigated an essentially uninterrupted series of 
use of force cases out of the city jails.393 
                                                                                                                 
turned the tide in New York, which the police called the crack capital of the 
world . . . .  In Washington, however, the drug arrest rates actually declined in some 
of the peak crack years—and the city still recorded a steeper drop than New York in 
the percentage of its young residents using cocaine from 1990 to the present . . . .  In 
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 390. No. 75–cv–03073–LAP (S.D.N.Y. filed June 24, 1975). 
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sanitation, ventilation, and cooling of extended confinement units). 
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(2d Cir. 2003) (affirming most findings regarding unconstitutional environmental 
conditions in certain jails); Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 184, 190–91 (2d Cir. 
2001) (affirming findings of unconstitutional counsel visiting and restraint practices); 
Benjamin v. Malcolm, 803 F.2d 46, 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming order requiring 
state to remove from the city jails people convicted of felonies and sentenced to a 
prison term); Benjamin v. Horn, No. 75 Civ. 3073(HB), 2006 WL 1370970, at *1, *3 
(S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2006) (extending and supplementing an order concerning 
incarcerated individuals with conditions causing heat sensitivity); Benjamin v. Fraser, 
No. 75 Civ. 3073(HB), 2002 WL 31845111, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2002) (holding city 
in contempt for its failure to comply with a 2001 order concerning restraints); 
Benjamin v. Kerik, No. 75 CIV. 3073(HB), 1998 WL 799161, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 
1998) (finding unconstitutional fire safety conditions in several jails); Benjamin v. 
Malcolm, 156 F.R.D. 561, 566–68 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding city in contempt for its 
failure to comply with an order concerning food); Benjamin v. Sielaff, 752 F. Supp. 
140, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding city in contempt for its failure to comply with an 
order concerning housing); Benjamin v. Malcolm, 564 F. Supp. 668, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983) (holding jail crowding unconstitutional and ordering compliance with a 
population cap). 
 393. See, e.g., Nunez & United States v. City of New York, No. 1:11-cv-5845 (LTS-
THK) (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Ingles v. Toro, 438 F. Supp. 2d 203, 205–06 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); 
Sheppard v. Phoenix, 210 F. Supp. 2d 450, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  The case profile for 
the ongoing Nunez case is available at Case Profile, CIVIL RIGHTS LITIG. 
CLEARINGHOUSE, UNIV. OF MICH. L. SCH., https://www.clearinghouse.net/
detail.php?id=12072 [https://perma.cc/9ZR2-C68H].  
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Now, #CLOSErikers has bridged a gap between the dogged efforts 
of litigators and advocates to challenge horrific conditions at Rikers 
and the community’s demands for much broader systemic change.  
The Legal Aid Society and virtually every other group that has played 
a role in the Rikers reform and Rikers closure movements has an 
official seat at the #CLOSErikers table.394  Organizational decisions 
are made in a truly collaborative way.  Lawyers do not monopolize 
conversation and do not discern strategy in a vacuum.  For the first 
time, a multi-pronged approach has been developed that provides 
advocates of all stripes and all backgrounds with a space to talk, 
theorize, and strategize on the best way to solve the Rikers 
problem—the foremost among them being the culture and Rikers’ 
geographical location. 
Recently, the Independent Commission on New York City 
Criminal Justice and Incarceration Reform, or the Lippman 
Commission,395 issued detailed findings about the atrocious 
conditions of confinement on Rikers Island, stemming from a culture 
of brutality and dehumanization.396  The Commission recommended 
Rikers Island’s closure.397  The Lippman Commission report’s 
findings concerning Rikers Island’s culture of brutality and 
dehumanization, and poor conditions of confinement largely mirror 
what #CLOSErikers and advocates have been saying for decades—
Rikers Island’s lack of proximity to courts and family members 
isolates people detained there from critical support systems.398  
#CLOSErikers put geographic considerations at the center of its 
argument to close the Island.399  Those considerations were partially 
responsible for #CLOSErikers’ success.400  But only through a multi-
                                                                                                                 
 394. See Partners, #CLOSERIKERS, http://www.closerikers.org/partners/ 
[https://perma.cc/K6TT-4KZT]. 
 395. INDEP. COMM’N ON N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE & INCARCERATION REFORM, A 
MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY 13 (2017) [hereinafter A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY], 
http://www.morejustnyc.org/#home-1 [https://perma.cc/ZDV9-AD2M]. 
 396. Id. at 13–14. 
 397. Id. at 14. 
 398. These findings are not new.  Entities such as the New York City Board of 
Correction have found that detainees miss a bulk of their off-island medical and 
mental health appointments, due in part to distance and resources issues. Health 
Care in New York State Prisons, Hearing Before the Assemb. Comms. on Corr. & 
Health (Oct. 30, 2017) (statement of Bobby Cohen); see also A MORE JUST NEW 
YORK CITY, supra note 395, at 13–16. 
 399. See Fact Sheets, #CLOSERIKERS, http://www.closerikers.org/reimagining-
criminal-justice/ [https://perma.cc/W4AU-6KAD] (fact sheet information available by 
scrolling down page). 
 400. See, e.g., id. 
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pronged grassroots strategy were those considerations given full 
voice.  Even Deputy Mayor Sturz could not achieve what the 
advocates achieved where truly working in tandem. 
CONCLUSION 
Law is all too often billed as a neutral arbiter of social problems, 
and litigation is all too often billed as the vehicle for achieving 
neutral, socially just outcomes.  For that reason, lawyers are trained 
to develop their litigation skills before most other skills, and are 
convinced that almost anything is achievable through litigation.  In 
most cases, however, law and litigation cannot fit their bill.  As it 
relates to New York State prisons, law and litigation have proven 
insufficient to create sustained systemic change on their own.401  The 
same will prove true as advocates work to address the geographic 
sprawl of the prison system and its impact on mental health 
treatment, particularly the use of VTC and other technologies.402  
People who are passionate about solving those problems should 
borrow significantly from MHASC, #CLOSErikers, and other 
organizations that have paired the law and litigation with more robust 
grassroots strategies that center the narratives of people who are 
directly impacted.403  Those organizations provide a blueprint for 
working toward the larger goal of closing upstate prisons and taking 
advantage of mental health resources available only in more well 
populated urban centers.404  Only by building these nontraditional 
movements can we achieve sustainable systemic and institutional 
change. 
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